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An oblivious computation is one that is free of direct and indirect information leaks, e.g., due to observable
differences in timing and memory access patterns. This paper presents λobliv, a core language whose type
system enforces obliviousness. Prior work on type-enforced oblivious computation has focused on deterministic
programs. λobliv is new in its consideration of programs that implement probabilistic algorithms, such as
those involved in cryptography. λobliv employs a substructural type system and a novel notion of probability
region to ensure that information is not leaked via the observed distribution of visible events. Probability
regions support reasoning about probabilistic correlation and independence between values, and our use of
probability regions is motivated by a source of unsoundness that we discovered in the type system of ObliVM,
a language for implementing state of the art oblivious algorithms. We prove that λobliv’s type system enforces
obliviousness and show that it is expressive enough to typecheck advanced tree-based oblivious RAMs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing allows clients to conveniently outsource computation, but they must trust that
cloud providers do not exploit or mishandle sensitive information. To remove the provider from
the trusted computing base, work in both industry and research has strived to produce a secure
abstract machine comprising an execution engine and protected memory: The adversary cannot
see sensitive data as it is being operated on, nor can it observe such data at rest in memory. Such
an abstract machine can be realized by encrypting the data in memory and then performing
computations using cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., secure multi-party computation [Yao 1986])
or secure processors [Hoekstra 2015; Suh et al. 2003; Thekkath et al. 2000].
Unfortunately, a secure abstract machine does not defend against an adversary that can observe
memory access patterns [Islam et al. 2012; Maas et al. 2013; Zhuang et al. 2004] and instruction
timing [Brumley and Boneh 2003; Kocher 1996] (as made famous by recent Spectre and Meltdown
attacks [Kocher et al. 2019; Lipp et al. 2018; Van Bulck et al. 2018]), among other “side” channels
of information. For cloud computing, such an adversary is the cloud provider itself, which has
physical access to its machines, and so can observe traffic on the memory bus.
A countermeasure against an unscrupulous provider is to store code and data in oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [Maas et al. 2013; Suh et al. 2003]. First proposed by Goldreich [1987]; Goldreich and
Ostrovsky [1996], ORAM obfuscates the mapping between addresses and data, in effect “encrypting”
the addresses along with the data. Replacing RAM with ORAM solves (much of) the security
problem but incurs a substantial slowdown in practical situations [Liu et al. 2015a, 2013; Maas et al.
2013] as reads/writes add overhead that is polylogarithmic in the size of the memory.
Recent work has explored methods for reducing the cost of programming with ORAM. Liu
et al. [2015a, 2013, 2014] developed a family of type systems to check when partial use of ORAM
(alongside normal, encrypted RAM) results in no loss of security; i.e., only when the addresses of
secret data could (indirectly) reveal sensitive information must the data be stored in ORAM. This
optimization can provide order-of-magnitude (and asymptotic) performance improvements. Wang
et al. [2014] explored how to build oblivious data structures (ODSs), such as queues or stacks, that
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are more efficient than their standard counterparts implemented on top of ORAM. In followup
work, Liu et al. [2015b] devised a programming language called ObliVM1 for implementing such
oblivious data structures, and ORAMs themselves. A key feature of ObliVM is careful treatment of
random numbers, which are at the heart of state-of-the-art ORAM and ODS algorithms. While the
goal of ObliVM is that well-typed programs are secure, no formal argument to this effect is made.
In this paper, we present λobliv, a core language for oblivious computation, inspired by ObliVM.
λobliv extends a standard language with primitives for generating and using uniformly distributed
random numbers.We prove that λobliv’s type system guarantees probabilistic memory trace oblivious-
ness (PMTO), i.e., that the possible distribution of adversary-visible execution traces is independent
of the values of secret variables. This property generalizes the deterministic MTO property enforced
by Liu et al. [2015a, 2013], which did not consider the use of randomness. In carrying out this work,
we discovered that the ObliVM type system is unsound, so an important contribution of λobliv is a
design which achieves soundness without overly restricting or complicating the language.
λobliv’s type system aims to ensure that no probabilistic correlation forms between secrets and
publicly revealed random choices. In oblivious algorithms it is often the case that a security-sensitive
random choice is made (e.g., where to store a particular block in an ORAM), and eventually that
choice is made visible to the adversary (e.g., when a block is accessed by the client). This transition
from a hidden choice to a public one—which we call a revelation—is not problematic so long as the
revealed value does not communicate information about a secret. λobliv ensures that revelations do
not communicate information by guaranteeing that all revealed values are uniformly distributed.
λobliv’s type system, presented in Section 3, ensures that revelations are uniformly distributed
by treating randomly generated numbers as affine, meaning they cannot be freely copied. Affinity
prevents revealing the same number twice, which is problematic because a second revelation is not
uniformly distributed when conditioned on observing the first. Unfortunately, strict affinity is too
strong for implementing oblivious algorithms, which require the ability to make copies of random
numbers which are later revealed. λobliv’s type system addresses this by allowing random numbers
to be copied as non-affine secret values which can never be revealed. Moreover, λobliv enforces
that random numbers do not influence the choice of whether or not they are revealed, since this
could also result in a non-uniform revelation. For example, a λobliv program cannot copy a random
number to a secret, look at that secret, and then decide whether or not to reveal the original random
number. The type system prevents this behavior by using a new mechanism we call probability
regions to track the probabilistic (in)dependence of values in the program. (Probability regions are
missing in ObliVM, and their absence is the source of ObliVM’s unsoundness.) Section 4 outlines
the proof that λobliv enjoys PMTO by relating its semantics to a novelmixed semantics whose terms
operate on distributions directly, which makes it easier to state and prove the PMTO property.
While we have not retrofitted λobliv’s type system into ObliVM, we have implemented a type
checker for an extension of λobliv. Section 5 presents an implementation of a tree-based ORAM,
a state-of-the-art class of ORAM implementations [Shi et al. 2011; Stefanov et al. 2013; Wang
et al. 2015], that type checks in our language. We also show in Appendix A.1 that λobliv can also
type check oblivious stacks [Wang et al. 2014], though with some caveats. To our knowledge, our
implementation constitute the first automated verification that these data structures are indeed
oblivious. Although there are still oblivious algorithms which cannot be verified by λobliv, our work
subsumes all previous work on obliviousness by typing; section 6 discusses related work.
1http://www.oblivm.com
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1 B[0] ← s0
2 B[1] ← s1
3 ...
4 let s = ... // secret bit
5 let r = B[s] // leaks s
6 // via address trace
1 B[0] ← s0
2 B[1] ← s1
3 ...
4 let s = ... // secret bit
5 let s0 ' = B[0]
6 let s1 ' = B[1]
7 let r ,_ = mux(s,s1 ', s0 ')
1 let sk = flip ()
2 let s0 ', s1 ' = mux(castS(sk),s1 , s0)
3 B[0] ← s0 '
4 B[1] ← s1 '
5 ...
6 let s = ... // secret bit
7 let s ' = xor(s , sk)
8 let r = B[castP(s ') ]
(a) Leaky program (b) Deterministic MTO program (c) Probabilistic MTO program
Fig. 1. Code examples
2 OVERVIEW
This section presents the threat model and background on deterministic oblivious execution. The
next section sketches our novel type system for enforcing probabilistic oblivious execution.
2.1 Threat Model
We assume a powerful adversary that can make fine-grained observations about a program’s
execution. In particular, we use a generalization of the program counter (PC) security model [Molnar
et al. 2006]: The adversary knows the program being executed, can observe the PC during execution
as well as the contents and patterns of memory accesses. Some secret memory contents may be
encrypted (while public memory is not) but all addresses used to access memory are still visible.
Consider an untrusted cloud provider using a secure processor, like SGX [Hoekstra 2015].
Reads/writes to/from memory can be directly observed, but secret memory is encrypted (using
a key kept by the processor). The pattern of accesses, timing information, and other system
features (e.g., instruction cache misses) provide information about the PC. Another setting is
secure multi-party computation (MPC) using secret shares [Goldreich et al. 1987]. Here, two parties
simultaneously execute the same program (and thus know the program and program counter), but
certain values—the input values from each party—are kept hidden from both using secret sharing.
Our techniques can also handle weaker adversaries, such as those that can observe memory
traffic but not the PC, or can make timing measurements but cannot observe the PC or memory.
2.2 Oblivious Execution
Our goal is to ensure memory trace obliviousness (MTO), which is a kind of noninterference prop-
erty [Goguen and Meseguer 1982; Sabelfeld and Myers 2006]. This property states that despite
being able to observe each address (of instructions and data) as it is fetched, and each public value,
the adversary will not be able to infer anything about input secret values.
We can formalize this idea as a small-step operational semantics σ ; e −→t σ ′; e ′, which states
that an expression e in memory σ transitions to memory σ ′ and expression e ′ while emitting trace
event t . Trace events include fetched instruction addresses, public values, and addresses of public
and secret values that are read and written. (Secret values are not visible in the trace.) Under this
model, MTO means that running low-equivalent programs σ1; e1 and σ2; e2—meaning they agree on
the code and public values but may not agree on secret ones—will produce the exact same memory
trace, along with low-equivalent results. More formally, if σ1; e1 ∼ σ2; e2 then σ1; e1 −→t1 σ ′1; e ′1 and
σ2; e2 −→t2 σ ′2; e ′2 implies t1 = t2 and σ ′1; e ′1 ∼ σ ′2; e ′2, where ∼ denotes low-equivalence.
To illustrate how revealing addresses can leak information, consider the program in Figure 1(a).
Here, we assume array B’s contents are secret, and thus invisible to the adversary. Variables s0, s1,
and s are secret (i.e., encrypted) inputs. The assignments on the first two lines are safe since we are
just storing secret values in the secret array. The problem is on the last line, when the program uses
s to index B. Since the adversary is able to see which address was used (in trace t ), they can infer s.
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The program in Figure 1(b) fixes the problem. It reads both secret values from B, and then uses
the mux to select the one indicated by s, storing it in r. The semantics of mux is that if the first
argument is 1 it pairs and returns the second two arguments in order, otherwise it swaps them. To
the adversary this appears as a single program instruction, and so nothing is learned about s via
branching. Moreover, nothing is learned from the address trace: We always unconditionally read
both elements of B, no matter the value of s.
While this approach is secure, it is inefficient: To read a single secret value in B this code reads all
values in B, to hide which one is being selected. If B were an array of size N , this approach would
turn an O(1) operation into an O(N ) operation.
2.3 Probabilistic Oblivious Execution
To improve performance while retaining security, the key is to employ randomness. In particular,
the client can randomly generate and hold secret a key, using it to map logical addresses used by the
program to physical addresses visible to the adversary. The program in Figure 1(c) illustrates the
idea, hinting at the basic approach to implementing an ORAM. Rather than deterministically store
s0 and s1 in positions 0 and 1 of B, respectively, the program scrambles their locations according to
a coin flip, sk, generated by the call to flip , and not visible to the adversary. Using the mux on line
2, if sk is 1 then s0 and s1 will be copied to s0 ' and s1 ' , respectively, but if sk is 0 then s0 and s1 will
be swapped, with s0 going into s1 ' and s1 going into s0 ' . (The castS coercion on sk is a no-op, used
by the type system; it will be explained in the next subsection.) Values s0 ' and s1 ' are then stored
at positions 0 and 1, respectively, on lines 3 and 4. When the program later wishes to look up the
value at logical index s, it must consult sk to retrieve the mapping. This is done via the xor on line 7.
Then s ' is used to index B and retrieve the value logically indicated by s.
In terms of memory accesses, this program is more efficient: It is reading B only once, rather than
twice. One can argue that more work is done overall, but as we will see in Section 5, this basic idea
does scale up to build full ORAMs with access times of O(logc N ) for some c (rather than O(N )).
sk=0 sk=1
s=0 0,1,0 0,1,1
s=1 0,1,1 0,1,0
Fig. 2. Possible traces
This program is also secure: no matter the value of s, the adversary learns
nothing from the address trace. Consider Figure 2 which tabulates the four
possible traces (the memory indexes used to access B) depending on the
possible values of s and sk. This table makes plain that our program is not
deterministically MTO. Looking at column sk=0, we can see that a program
that has s=0 may produce trace 0,1,0 while a program that uses s=1 may
produce trace 0,1,1; MTO programs may not produce different traces when using different secrets.
But this is not actually a problem. Assuming that sk = 0 and sk = 1 are equally likely, we can see
that address traces 0,1,0 and 0,1,1 are also equally likely no matter whether s = 0 or s = 1. More
specifically, if we assume the adversary’s expectation for secret values is uniformly distributed,
then after conditioning on knowledge of the third memory access, the adversary’s expectation for
the secret remains unchanged, and thus nothing is learned about s. This probabilistic model of
adversary knowledge is captured by a probabilistic variant of MTO. In particular, the probability of
any particular trace event t emitted by two low-equivalent programs should be the same for both
programs, and the resulting programs should also be low-equivalent. More formally: If σ1; e1 ∼ σ2; e2
then Pr[σ1; e1 −→t σ ′1; e ′1] = q1 and Pr[σ2; e2 −→t σ ′2; e ′2] = q2 implies q1 = q2 and σ ′1; e ′1 ∼ σ ′2; e ′2.
2.4 λobliv: Obliviousness by Typing
The main contribution of this paper is λobliv, an expressive language whose type system guarantees
that programs are probabilistically MTO. Unlike prior work [Liu et al. 2015a, 2013], λobliv does not
assume the presence of an ORAM as a black box. Rather, as Section 5 shows, λobliv’s type system
is powerful enough to type check ORAM implementations, which use randomness to improve
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1 let sx , sy = ( flip () , flip () )
2 let sz ,_ = mux (s,sx , sy)
3 output (castP(sz ) ) (∗ OK ∗)
4 output (castP(sx) ) (∗ Bad ∗)
1 let sx , sy = ( flip () , flip () )
2 let sk ,_ = mux(castS(sx),sx , sy)
3 let sz ,_ = mux(s,sk,flip () )
4 output (castP(sz ) ) (∗ Bad ∗)
(a) Leak by multiple revelation (b) Leak due to probabilistic dependence
Fig. 3. Example leaky programs (precluded by λobliv type system)
efficiency [Shi et al. 2011; Stefanov et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2015]. λobliv is also powerful enough to
type check oblivious algorithms beyond ORAMs, as discussed in Appendix A.1.
λobliv’s type system’s power derives from two key features: affine treatment of random values,
and probability regions to track probabilistic (in)dependence (i.e., correlation) between random
values that could leak information when a value is revealed. Together, these features ensure that
each time a random value is revealed to the adversary—even if the value interacted with secrets,
like the secret memory layout of an ORAM—it is always uniformly distributed, which means that
its particular value communicates no secret information.
Affinity. In λobliv, public and secret bits are given types bitP and bitS respectively, and coin flips
are given type flip. (Our formalism uses bits for simplicity; it is easy to generalize to (random
fixed-width) integers, which is done in our implementation.) Values of flip type are, like secret bits
of type bitS, invisible to the adversary. But a flip can be revealed by using castP to convert it to a
public bit, as is done on line 8 of Figure 1(c) to perform a (publicly visible) array index operation.
The type system aims to ensure that a flip value is always uniformly distributed when it is
revealed. The uniformity requirement implies that each flip should be revealed at most once. Why?
Because the second time a flip is revealed, its distribution is conditioned on prior revelations,
meaning the each outcome is no longer equally likely. To see how this situation could end up
leaking secret information, consider the example in Figure 3(a). Lines 1–3 in this code are safe:
we generate two coin flips that are invisible to the adversary, and then store one of them in sz
depending on whether the secret s is 1 or not. Revealing sz at line 3 is safe: regardless of whether sz
contains the contents of sx or sy, the fact that both are uniformly distributed means that whatever
is revealed, nothing can be learned about s. However, revealing sx on line 4, after having revealed
sz, is not safe. This is because seeing two ones or two zeroes in a row is more likely when sz is sx,
which happens when s is one. So this program violates PMTO.
To prevent this problem, λobliv’s type system treats values of type flip affinely, meaning that
each can be used at most once. The read of sx on line 2 consumes that variable, so it cannot be used
again on the problematic line 4. Likewise, flip variable sk is consumed when passed to xor on line 7
of Figure 1(c), and s ' is consumed when revealed on line 8.
Unfortunately, a purely affine treatment of flips would preclude useful algorithms. In particular,
notice that line 2 of Figure 1(c) uses sk as the guard of a mux. If doing so consumed sk, line 7’s use
of sk would fail to type check. To avoid this problem, λobliv relaxes the affinity constraint on flips
passed to castS. In effect, programs can make many secret bitS copies of a flip, and compute with
them, but only the original flip can ultimately be revealed.
It turns out that this relaxed treatment of affinity is insufficient to ensure PMTO. The reason is
that we can now use non-affine copies of a coin to make a flip’s distribution non-uniform when it
is revealed. To see how, consider the code in Figure 3(b). This code flips two coins, and then uses
the mux to store the first coin flip, sx, in sk if sx is 1, else to store the second coin flip there. Now sk
is more likely to be 1 than not: Pr[sk = 1] = 34 while Pr[sk = 0] = 14 . On line 3, the mux will store
sk in sz if secret s is 1, which means that if the adversary observes a 1 from the output on line 4, it is
more likely than not that s is 1. The same sort of issue would happen if we replaced line 1 from
Figure 1(c) with the first two lines above: when the program looks up B[castP(s ') ] on line 8, if the
adversary observes 1 for the address, it is more likely that s is 0, and vice versa if the adversary
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ℓ ∈ labelF P | S public and secret
(where P ⊏ S) security labels
ρ ∈ R F . . . probability region
b ∈ BF O | I bits
x ,y ∈ varF . . . variables
v ∈ valF x variable values
| funy (x :τ ).e function values
| ⟨v,v⟩ tuple values
τ ∈ typeF bitρ
ℓ
non-random bit
| flipρ secret uniform bit
| ref(τ ) reference
| τ × τ tuple
| τ → τ function
e ∈ expF v value expressions
| bℓ bit literal
| flipρ () coin flip in region
| castℓ(v) cast flip to bit
| mux(e, e, e) atomic conditional
| xor(e, e) bit xor
| if(e){e}{e} branch conditional
| ref(e) reference creation
| read(e) reference read
| write(e, e) reference write
| ⟨e, e⟩ tuple creation
| let x = e in e variable binding
| let x ,y = e in e tuple elimination
| e(e) fun. application
Fig. 4. λobliv Syntax (source programs)
observes 1. Notice that we have not violated affinity here: no coin flip has been used more than
once (other than uses of castS which side-step affinity tracking). The problematic correlation in
Figure 3(b) is incorrectly allowed by ObliVM [Liu et al. 2015b], and is the root of its unsoundness.
Probability regions. λobliv’s type system addresses the problem of probabilistic correlations leading
to non-uniform distributions using a novel construct we call probability regions, which are static
names that represent sets of coin flips, reminiscent of a points-to location in alias analysis [Emami
et al. 1994]. We have elided the region name in our examples so far, but normally programmers
should write flipρ () for flipping a coin in region ρ, which then has type flipρ . Bits derived from
flips via castS carry the region of the original flip, so bit types also include a region ρ.
Regions form a partial order, and the type system enforces an invariant that each flip labeled
with region ρ is probabilistically independent of all bits derived from flips at regions ρ ′ when
ρ ′ ⊏ ρ. Then, the type system will prevent problematic correlations arising among bits and flips,
in particular via the mux and xor operations, in a way that could threaten uniformity. We can see
regions at work in the problematic example above: the region of the secret bit castS(sx) is the same
region as sx, since castS(sx) was derived from sx. As such, there is no assurance of probabilistic
independence between the guard and the branch; indeed, when conditioning on castS(sx) to return
sx, the output will not be uniform. On the other hand, if the guard of a mux is a bit in region ρ and
its branches are flips in region ρ ′ where ρ ⊏ ρ ′, then the guard is derived from a flip that is sure to
be independent of the branches, so the uniformity of the output is not threatened. This kind of
provable independence is a critical piece of our Tree ORAM implementation in Section 5.
3 FORMALISM
This section presents the syntax, semantics, and type system of λobliv. The following section proves
that λobliv’s type system is sufficient to ensure PMTO.
3.1 Syntax
Figure 4 shows the syntax for λobliv. The term language is expressions e . The set of values v is
comprised of (1) base values such as variables x (included to enable a substitution-based semantics)
and recursive function definitions funy (x :τ ).e where the function body may refer to itself using
variabley; and (2) connectives from the expression language e which identify a subset of expressions
which are also values, such as pairs ⟨v,v) with type τ × τ .
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Expressions also include bit literals bℓ (of type bit⊥ℓ ) which are either O or I and annotated with
their security label ℓ.2 A security label ℓ is either S (secret) or P (public). Values with the label S
are invisible to the adversary. Bit types include this security label along with a probability region
ρ. The expression flipρ () produces a flip value, i.e., a uniformly random bit of type flipρ . The
annotation assigns the coin to region ρ. Coin flips are semantically secret, and have limited use;
we can compute on one using mux or xor, cast one to a public bit via castP, or cast to a secret bit via
castS. To simplify the type system, casts only apply to values, however castℓ(e) could be used as
shorthand for let x = e in castℓ(x).
The expression mux(e1, e2, e3) unconditionally evaluates e2 and e3 and returns their values as a
pair in the given order if e1 evaluates to I, or in the opposite order if it evaluates to O. This operation
is critical for obliviousness because it is atomic. By contrast, normal conditionals if(e1){e2}{e3}
evaluate either e2 or e3 depending on e1, never both, so the branch taken is evident from the trace.
The components of tuples e1 constructed as ⟨e1, e2⟩ can be accessed via let x1,x2 = e1 in e2. λobliv
also has normal let binding, function application, and means to manipulate mutable reference cells.
λobliv captures the key elements that make implementing oblivious algorithms possible, notably:
random and secret bits, trace-oblivious multiplexing, public revelation of secret random values, and
general computational support in tuples, conditionals and recursive functions. Other features can
be encoded in these, e.g., general numbers and operators on them can be encoded as tuples of bits,
and arrays can be encoded as tuples of references (read/written using (nested) conditionals). Our
prototype interpreter implements these things directly, as well as region polymorphism (Section 5).
3.2 Semantics
Figure 5 presents a monadic, probabilistic small-step semantics for λobliv programs. The top of the
figure contains some new and extended syntax. Values (and, by extension, expressions) are extended
with forms for bit values bitvℓ(b), flip values flipv(b), and reference locations locv(ι); these do not
appear in source programs. Stores σ map locations to values. Stores are paired with expressions to
form configurations ς . A sequence of configurations arising during an evaluation is collected in
a trace t . We use Hieb-Felleisen-style contexts [Felleisen and Hieb 1992] to define E (not shown)
which follows a left-to-right, call-by-value evaluation strategy.
The semantics is defined using an abstract probability monad M. Below the semantics we
define the standard “denotational” probability monad D [Giry 1982; Ramsey and Pfeffer 2002a],
whereD(A) represents a probability distribution over objects in some countable setA. The standard
semantics for our language occurs whenM = D, and we leaveM a parameter so we can instantiate
the semantics to a new monad in the next section.
In the probability monad D, the return operation constructs a point distribution, and the bind
operation encodes the law of total probability, i.e., constructs a marginal distribution from a
conditional one. We only use proper distributions in the sense that the combined mass of all
elements sums to 1. We do not denote possibly non-terminating programs directly into the monad,
and therefore do not require the use of computable distributions [Huang and Morrisett 2016] or
sub-probability distributions [Monniaux 2000]—we use the monad only to denote distributions of
configurations which occur after a finite number of small-step transitions, which is total.
The definition of stepM describes how a single configuration advances in a single probabilistic
step, yielding a distribution of resulting configurations. The definition uses Haskell-style do notation
as the usual notation for bind. Starting from the bottom, we can see that a valuev advances to itself
(more on why, below) and evaluating a redex e within a context E steps the former and packages
its result back with the latter, as usual. The cases for let binding, pair deconstruction, and function
2Bit literals are not values to create symmetry with the alternative, mixed semantics in the next section.
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ι ∈ loc ≈ N ref locations
v ∈ valF . . . extended. . .
| bitvℓ(b) bit value
| flipv(b) uniform bit value
| locv(ι) location value
σ ∈ store ≜ loc ⇀ val store
e ∈ expF . . . extended. . .
ς ∈ configF σ , e configuration
t ∈ traceF ϵ | t ·ς trace
E ∈ contextF . . . eval contexts. . .
stepM ∈ N × config ⇀M(config)
stepM (N ,σ ,bℓ) = return(σ , bitvℓ(b))
stepM (N ,σ , flipρ ()) = do b ← bit(N ) ; return(σ , flipv(b))
stepM (N ,σ , castℓ(flipv(b))) = return(σ , bitvℓ(b))
stepM (N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ1 (b1), bitvℓ2 (b2), bitvℓ3 (b3))) = return(σ , ⟨bitvℓ(cond(b1,b2,b3)), bitvℓ(cond(b1,b3,b2))⟩)
where ℓ ≜ ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 ⊔ ℓ3
stepM (N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ(b1), flipv(b2), flipv(b3))) = return(σ , ⟨flipv(cond(b1,b2,b3)), flipv(cond(b1,b3,b2))⟩)
stepM (N ,σ , if(bitvℓ(b)){e1}{e2}) = return(σ , cond(b, e1, e2))
stepM (N ,σ , xor(bitvℓ(b1), flipv(b2))) = return(σ , flipv(b1 ⊕ b2))
stepM (N ,σ , ref(v)) = return(σ [ι 7→ v], refv(ι)) where ι < dom(σ )
stepM (N ,σ , read(refv(ι))) = return(σ ,σ (ι))
stepM (N ,σ , write(refv(ι),v)) = return(σ [ι 7→ v],σ (ι))
stepM (N ,σ , let x = v in e) = return(σ , [v/x]e)
stepM (N ,σ , let x1,x2 = ⟨v1,v2⟩ in e) = return(σ , [v1/x1][v2/x2]e)
stepM (N ,σ , (funy (x : τ ). e
v1
)(v2)) = return(σ , [v1/y][v2/x]e)
stepM (N ,σ ,E[e]) = do σ ′, e ′ ← stepM (N ,σ , e) ; return(σ ′,E[e ′])
stepM (N ,σ ,v) = return(σ ,v)
nstepM ∈ N × config ⇀M(trace)
nstepM (0, ς) = return(ϵ ·ς)
nstepM (N + 1, ς) = do t ·ς ′ ← nstepM (N , ς) ; ς ′′ ← stepM (N + 1, ς ′) ; return(t ·ς ′·ς ′′)
x˜ ∈ D(A) ≜
{
f ∈ A→ R
 ∑
x ∈A
f (x) = 1
}
Pr [x˜ Û= x] ≜ x˜(x) D(A) ∈ set
return ∈ D(A) bind ∈ D(A) × (A→ D(B)) → D(B) bit ∈ N→ D(B)
return(x) ≜ λx ′.
{
1 if x = x ′
0 if x , x ′ bind(x˜ , f ) ≜ λy.
∑
x
f (x)(y)x˜(x) bit(N ) ≜ λb . 1/2
Fig. 5. λobliv Semantics
application are standard, using a substitution-based semantics. Likewise, rules for creating, reading,
and writing from references operate on the store σ as usual.
Moving to the first case, we see that literals bℓ evaluate in one step to bit values. A flipρ ()
expression evaluates to either flipv(I) or flipv(O) as determined by bit(N ), which for the monad
D yields 1/2 probability for each outcome. (The monad D does not use the N parameter in its
definition of bit(N ), however a later monad will.) The castℓ case converts a flip to a similarly-labeled
bit value. The next few cases use the three-argument metafunction cond(b,X ,Y ), which returns X
if b is I, and Y otherwise. The two mux cases operate in a similar way: they return the second two
arguments of the mux in order when the first argument is bitvℓ(I), and in reverse order when it is
bitvℓ(O). The security label of the result is the join of the labels of all elements in involved. (This is
not needed for flip values, since these are always fixed to be secret.) The case for if also uses cond
in the expected manner. The case for xor permits xor-ing a bit with a flip, returning a flip.
The bottom of the figure defines function nstepM(N , ς). It composes N invocations of stepM
starting at ς to produce a distribution of traces t .
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•
τ ∈ t •ypeF τ | • (where τ ⊏ •)
κ ∈ kindF U | A (where U ⊏ A)
Γ ∈ tcxt ≜ var ⇀ t •ype
(Γ1 ⊔ Γ2)(x) ≜ Γ1(x) ⊔ Γ2(x)
K ∈ type→kind
K(bitρ
ℓ
) ≜ K(τ1→τ2) ≜ K(ref(τ )) ≜ U K(flipρ ) ≜ A K(τ1×τ2) ≜ K(τ1)⊔K(τ2)
Γ ⊢ e : τ ; ΓVarU
K(Γ(x)) = U
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ
VarA
K(Γ(x)) = A
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ[x 7→•]
Bit
Γ ⊢ bℓ : bit⊥ℓ ; Γ
Flip
Γ ⊢ flipρ () : flipρ ; Γ
Cast-S
Γ ⊢ x : flipρ ;
Γ ⊢ castS(x) : bitρS ; Γ
Cast-P
Γ ⊢ x : flipρ ; Γ′
Γ ⊢ castP(x) : bit⊥P ; Γ′
If
Γ′ ⊢ e1 : τ ; Γ′′1
Γ ⊢ e : bit⊥P ; Γ′ Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′2
Γ ⊢ if(e){e1}{e2} : τ ; Γ′′1 ⊔ Γ′′2
Mux-Bit
Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : bitρ2ℓ2 ; Γ
′′ ℓ = ℓ1⊔ℓ2⊔ℓ3
Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : bitρ3ℓ3 ; Γ
′′′ ρ = ρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3
Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : bitρℓ ×bit
ρ
ℓ
; Γ′′′
Mux-Flip
Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ3
Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : flipρ3 ; Γ′′′ ρ = ρ1⊔ ρ2⊔ρ3
Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : flipρ×flipρ ; Γ′′′
Xor-Flip
Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Γ ⊢ xor(e1, e2) : flipρ2 ; Γ′′
Ref
Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′
Γ ⊢ ref(e) : ref(τ ) ; Γ′
Read
K(τ ) = U
Γ ⊢ e : ref(τ ) ; Γ′
Γ ⊢ read(e) : τ ; Γ′
Write
Γ ⊢ e1 : ref(τ ) ; Γ′ Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′
Γ ⊢ write(e1, e2) : τ ; Γ′′
Tup
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′ Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′
Γ ⊢ ⟨e1, e2⟩ : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′′
Fun
Γ+ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→τ1,y 7→(τ1→τ2)]
Γ+ ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ+′ Γ+′ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→ ,y 7→ ]
Γ ⊢ funy (x : τ1). e : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ
App
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ′
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ1 ; Γ′′
Γ ⊢ e1(e2) : τ2 ; Γ′′
Let
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′ Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→τ1]
Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′+ Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ ]
Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′
Let-Tup
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′ Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x1 7→τ1,x2 7→τ2]
Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′+ Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x1 7→ ,x2 7→ ]
Γ ⊢ let x1,x2 = e1 in e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′
Fig. 6. λobliv Type System (source programs)
3.3 Type System
Figure 6 defines the type system for λobliv source programs as rules for judgment Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′,
which states that under type environment Γ expression e has type τ , and yields residual type
environment Γ′. We discuss typing configurations, including non-source program values, in the
next section. Type environments map variables to either types τ or inaccessibility tags •, which
are used to enforce affinity of flips. We discuss the three key features of the type system—affinity,
probability regions, and information flow control—in turn.
Affinity. To enforce non-duplicability, when an affine variable is used by the program, its type is
removed from the residual environment. Figure 6 defines kinding metafunction K that assigns a
type either the kind universal U (freely duplicatable) or affine A (non-duplicatable). Bits, functions,
and references (but not their contents, necessarily) are always universal, and flips are always affine.
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A pair is considered affine if either of its components is. Rule VarU in Figure 6 types universally-
kinded variables; the output environment Γ is the same as the input environment. Rule VarA types
an affine variable by marking it • in the output environment. This rule is sufficient to rule out the
first problematic example in Section 2.4.
Rules Cast-S and Cast-P permit converting flips to bits via the castS and castP coercions, respectively.
The first converts a flipρ to a bitρS and does not make its argument inaccessible (it returns the
original Γ) while the second converts to a bit⊥P and does make it inaccessible (returning Γ
′). The
type system is enforcing that any random number is made adversary-visible at most once; secret
copies are allowed because they are never revealed.
References may contain affine values, but references themselves are universal. Rather than track
the affinity of aliased contents specifically, the Read rule disallows reading out of a reference cell
whose contents are affine. Since the write operation returns the old contents of the cell, programs
can see the existing contents of any reference by first writing in a valid replacement [Baker 1992].
The Fun rule ensures that no affine variables in the defining context are consumed within the
body of the function, i.e., they are not captured by its closure. We write Γ ⊎ [x 7→ ,y 7→ ] to
split a context into the part that binds x and y and Γ binds the rest; it is the Γ part that is returned,
dropping the x and y bindings. Both Let and Let-Tup similarly remove their bound variables.
Finally, note that different variables could be made inaccessible in different branches of a condi-
tional, so If types each branch in the same initial context, but then joins their the output contexts;
if a variable is made inaccessible by one branch, it will be inaccessible in the joined environment.
Information flow. The type system aims to ensure that bits bℓ whose security label ℓ is secret
S cannot be learned by an adversary. Bit types bitρ
ℓ
include the security label ℓ. The rules treat
types with different labels as distinct, preventing so-called explicit flows. For example, the Write
rule prevents assigning a secret bit (of type bitρS ) to a reference whose type is ref(bitρP ). Likewise,
a function of type bitρP → τ cannot be called with an argument of type bitρS , per the App rule. In
our implementation we relax App (but not Write, due to the invariance of reference types) to allow
public bits when secrets are expected; this is not done here just to keep things simpler.
The rules also aim to prevent implicit information flows. A typical static information flow type
system [Sabelfeld and Myers 2006] would require the type of the conditional’s guard to be less
secret than the type of what it returns; e.g., the guard’s type could be bitρS but only if the final
type τ is secret too. However, in λobliv we must be more restrictive: rule If requires the guard to be
public since the adversary-visible execution trace reveals which branch is taken, and thus the truth
of the guard. Branching on secrets must be done via mux. Notice that rule Mux-Bit sets the label ℓ of
the each element of the returned pair to be the join of the labels on the guard and the remaining
components. As such, if the guard was secret, then the returned results will be. The Mux-Flip rule
always returns flips, which are invisible to the adversary, so the guard can be secret or public.
Probability regions. A probability region ρ appears on both bit and flip types. The region is a
static name for a collection of flip values and secret bit values that may be derived from them. A flip
value is associated with a region ρ when it is created, per rule Flip. Rule Cast-S ascribes the region ρ
from the input flipρ to the output type bitρS , tracking the flip value(s) from which the secret bit
value was possibly derived. Per rule Bit, bit literals have probability region ⊥, as do public bits
produced by castP, per rule Cast-P.
Regions form a join semi-lattice. The type system maintains the invariant that flips at region
ρ are probabilistically independent of all secret bits in regions ρ ′ when strictly ordered ρ ′ ⊏ ρ.
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Strict ordering is used because it is irreflexive and asymmetric. The semantic property of interest—
probabilistic independence—is likewise irreflexive, and asymmetry is used to allow future mux
operations between values in one direction only; we discuss asymmetry in more detail below.
Strict ordering is enforced when typing Mux-Flip rule. If a secret bit is typed at region ρ1 and a flip
value at region ρ2, and ρ1 ̸⊏ ρ2, then it may be that the values are correlated, and a mux involving
the values may produce flips that are non-uniform. irreflexive; when a Both the Mux-Flip and Mux-Bit
rules return outputs whose region is the join of the regions of all inputs, indicating that the result
of the mux is only independent of values that were jointly independent of each of its components.
Because freshly generated random bits are always independent of each other, the programmer is
free to choose any regions when generating them via flipρ () expressions. However, once chosen,
the ordering establishes an invariant which constrains the order in which mux operations can
occur subsequently in the program. Requiring strict region ordering for mux operations is enough
to reject the example from the end of Section 2.4, as it could produce a non-uniform coin sk. We
recast the example below, labeled (a), using regions ρ1 ⊏ ρ2.
1 let sx , sy = ( flipρ1 () , flipρ2 () )
2 let sk ,_ = mux(castS(sx),sx , sy)
(a) Incorrect example
1 let sx = flipρ1 () in
2 let sy , sz = mux(castS(sx),flipρ2 () , flipρ2 () )
(b) Correct example
The type checker first ascribes types flipρ1 and flipρ2 to sx and sy, respectively, according to rules
Let-Tup, Flip, and Tup. It uses Cast-S to give castS(sx) type bitρ1S and leaves sx accessible so that VarA
can be used to give it and sy types flipρ1 and flipρ2 , respectively (then making them inaccessible).
Rule Mux-Flip will now fail because the independence conditions do not hold. In particular, the
region ρ1 of the guard is not strictly less than the region ρ1 of the second argument, i.e., ρ1 ̸⊏ ρ1.
The program labeled (b) above is well-typed. Here, the bit in the guard has region ρ1, the region
of the two flips is ρ2 and ρ1 ⊏ ρ2 as required by Mux-Flip. It is easy to see that both sy and sz are
uniformly distributed and independent of sx.
Rule Xor-Flip permits xor’ing a secret with a flip, returning a flip, as long as the secret’s region
and the flip’s region are well ordered, which preserves uniformity.
An earlier version of the λobliv type system did not order regions, but rather attempted to simply
maintain an invariant that flips and bits in distinct regions are independent. This turns out to not
work. While at the outset a fresh flip value is independent of all other values in the context of
the program, the region ordering is needed to ensure that mux operations will only occur in “one
direction.” E.g., if two fresh flip values are created x = flipρ1 () and y = flipρ2 , it is true that both
x ⊥ y and y ⊥ x . Thus it would seem reasonable that mux(castS (x),y, . . .) and mux(castS (y),x , . . .)
should both be well typed. While they are both safe in isolation, the combination is problematic.
Consider the results of each mux—they are both flip values, and they are both valid to reveal using
castP individually. However, the resulting values are correlated (revealing one tells you information
about the distribution of the other), which violates the uniformity guarantee of all castP results.
By ordering the regions, we are essentially promising to only allow mux operations like this in one
direction but not the other, and therefore uniformity is never violated for revealed flip values. For
example, by requiring ρ1 ⊏ ρ2 we allow the first mux above but not the second.
Type safety. λobliv is type safe in the traditional sense, i.e., that a well-typed program will not
get stuck. However, our interest is in the stronger property that type-safe λobliv programs do not
reveal secret information via inferences an adversary can draw from observing their execution. We
state and prove this stronger property in the next section.
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•
v ∈ v•alueF . . . | •
•
e ∈ e•xpF . . . | •
•
σ ∈ st•ore ≜ loc ⇀ v•alue
•
ς ∈ co•nfigF •σ , •e
•
t ∈ tr•aceF ϵ | •t ·•ς
obs ∈ (exp→ e•xp) × (store→ st•ore) × (config→ co•nfig) × (trace→ tr•ace)
obs(x) ≜ x
obs(funy (x : τ ). e) ≜ funy (x : τ ). obs(e)
obs(bitvP (b)) ≜ bitvP (b)
obs(bitvS (b)) ≜ •
obs(flipv(b)) ≜ •
obs(locv(ι)) ≜ •
obs(bP ) ≜ bP
obs(bS ) ≜ •
obs(flipρ ()) ≜ flipρ ()
obs(castℓ(v)) ≜ castℓ(obs(v))
obs(mux(e1, e2, e3)) ≜ mux(obs(e1), obs(e2), obs(e3))
obs(xor(e1, e2)) ≜ xor(obs(e1), obs(e2))
obs(if(e1){e2}{e3}) ≜ if(obs(e1)){obs(e2)}{obs(e3)}
obs(ref(e)) ≜ ref(obs(e))
obs(read(e)) ≜ read(obs(e))
obs(write(e1, e2)) ≜ write(obs(e1), obs(e2))
obs(⟨e1, e2⟩) ≜ ⟨obs(e1), obs(e2)⟩
obs(let x = e1 in e2) ≜ let x = obs(e1) in obs(e2)
obs(let x ,y = e1 in e2) ≜ let x ,y = obs(e1) in obs(e2)
obs(e1(e2)) ≜ obs(e1)(obs(e2))
obs(σ ) ≜ {ι 7→obs(v) | ι 7→v∈σ }
obs(σ , e) ≜ obs(σ ), obs(e)
obs(ϵ) ≜ ϵ
obs(t ·ς) ≜ obs(t)·obs(ς)
o˜bs(t˜) ≜ do t ← t˜ ; return(obs(t)) o˜bs ∈ D(trace) → D(tr•ace)
Fig. 7. Adversary observability
4 PROBABILISTIC MEMORY TRACE OBLIVIOUSNESS
The main metatheoretic result of this paper is that λobliv’s type system ensures probabilistic memory
trace obliviousness (PMTO). This section defines this property, and then walks through its proof.
4.1 What is PMTO?
Figure 7 presents a model obs of the adversary’s view of a computation as a new class of values,
expressions and traces that “hide” sub-expressions (written •) considered to be secret. Secret bit
expressions, secret bit values, and secret flip values all map to •. Compound values, expressions,
stores, traces etc. call obs in recursive positions as expected.
Probabilistic memory trace obliviousness (PMTO), stated formally below, holds when observa-
tionally equivalent configurations induce distributions of traces that are themselves observationally
equivalent after N steps, for any N .3
Proposition 4.1 (Probabilistic Memory Trace Obliviousness (PMTO)).
If: e1 and e2 are closed source expressions, ⊢ e1 : τ , ⊢ e2 : τ and obs(e1) = obs(e2)
Then: (1) nstepD(N ,, e1) and nstepD(N ,, e2) are defined
And: (2) o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e1)) = o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e2)).
(1) ensures that information is not leaked due to lack of progress, i.e., if either program gets “stuck,”
and that the main property (2) applies to all related, well-typed source expressions e1 and e2.
The remainder of this section works through our proof of PMTO, which follows three steps. First,
we define an alternative mixed semantics for λobliv programs that simplifies inductive reasoning
about the adversary’s view. Second, we prove that key invariants about probabilistic values are
ensured by mixed typing. Finally, we prove PMTO for the mixed semantics, and then show that it
faithfully simulates the standard semantics and the adversary’s view of its events.
3Typically noninterference properties are stated with a non-empty store. Our notion of expression equivalence is simpler,
and supports low-equivalent expressions that pre-populate such a store, so there is no loss of generality.
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step ∈ N × config ⇀ I(config)
step(N ,σ ,bℓ) ≜ return(σ , bitvℓ(return(b)))
step(N ,σ , flipρ ()) ≜ return(σ , flipv(bit(N )))
step(N ,σ , castS (flipv(bˆ))) ≜ return(σ , bitvS (bˆ))
step(N ,σ , castP (flipv(bˆ))) ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(σ , bitvP (return(b)))
step(N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ1 (bˆ1), bitvℓ2 (bˆ2), bitvℓ3 (bˆ3))) ≜ return(σ , ⟨bitvℓ(cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), bitvℓ(cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩)
where ℓ ≜ ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 ⊔ ℓ3
step(N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ(bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2), flipv(bˆ3))) ≜ return(σ , ⟨flipv(cond(b̂1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩)
step(N ,σ , xor(bitvℓ1 (bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2))) ≜ return(σ , flipv(bˆ1 ⊕ˆ bˆ2))
step(N ,σ , if(bitvℓ(bˆ)){e1}{e2}) ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(σ , cond(b, e1, e2))
step(N ,σ , ref(v)) ≜ return(σ [ι 7→ v], refv(ι)) where ι < dom(σ )
step(N ,σ , read(refv(ι))) ≜ return(σ ,σ (ι))
step(N ,σ , write(refv(ι),v)) ≜ return(σ [ι 7→ v],σ (ι))
step(N ,σ , let x = v in e) ≜ return(σ , e[v/x])
step(N ,σ , let x1,x2 = ⟨v1,v2⟩ in e) ≜ return(σ , e[v1/x1][v2/x2])
step(N ,σ , (funy (x : τ ). e
v1
)(v2)) ≜ return(σ , e[v1/y][v2/x])
step(N ,σ ,E[e]) ≜ do σ ′, e ′ ← step(N ,σ , e) ; return(σ ′,E[e ′])
step(N ,σ ,v) ≜ return(σ ,v)
nstep ∈ N × config ⇀ I(trace)
nstep(0, ς) ≜ return(ϵ ·ς)
nstep(N + 1, ς) ≜ do t ·ς ′ ← nstep(N , ς) ; ς ′′ ← step(N + 1, ς ′) ; return(t ·ς ′·ς ′′)
Fig. 8. Mixed Language Semantics, where bˆ ∈ I(B) is a distributional bit value (see text)
4.2 Mixed Semantics
An intuitive approach to proving Proposition 4.1 is to prove that a single-step version of it holds
for stepD , and then use that fact in an inductive proof over nstepD . Unfortunately, proving the
single-step version quickly runs into trouble. Consider a source program castP(flipρ ()) which steps
to each of the expressions castP(flipv(I)) and castP(flipv(O)) with probability 1/2. These expressions
are observationally equivalent—the adversary’s view of each is castP(•). For single-step PMTO to
be satisfied, each of these terms must step to an equivalent distribution. Unfortunately, they do not:
The first produces a point distribution of the expression bitvP(I) and the second produces a point
distribution of the expression bitvP(O), which are not observationally the same.
To address this problem, we define an alternative mixed semantics which embeds distributional
bit values directly into (single) traces. Instead of the semantics of flipρ () producing two possible
outcomes, in the mixed semantics it produces just one: a single distributional value flipv(bˆ) where
the bˆ represents either I or O with equal probability. Doing this is like treating flipρ () expressions
lazily, and lines up (mixed) traces with the adversary’s view •.
The mixed semantics amends the syntax of flipv and bitvℓ to be distributional (i.e., they contain bˆ
rather than justb). Other values from the standard semantics’ syntax (top of Figure 5) are unchanged.
As such, a distribution of pairs of bit values (say) is represented as pair of distributional bit values.
To allow values inside the pair to be correlated, we represent them using what we call intensional
distributions—intensional distributions are written I(A) and discussed in the next subsection.
The mixed semantics is shown in Figure 8. The mixed semantics step function step(N ,σ , e)maps
a configuration, ς ≜ σ , e to an intensional distribution of configurations I(config). Mixed semantics
expressions (and values, etc.) are underlined to distinguish them from the standard semantics, and
operations on distributional values are hatted.
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a ∈ A
xˆ ∈ I(A)F a | ‹xˆ xˆ›
p ∈ rpathF · | H○ :: p | T○ :: p
[ ] ∈ I(A) × rpath ⇀ A
a[p] ≜ a
‹xˆ1 xˆ2›[ H○ :: p] ≜ xˆ1[p]
‹xˆ1 xˆ2›[ T○ :: p] ≜ xˆ2[p]
support ∈ I(A) → ℘(A)
support(xˆ) ≜ {a | xˆ[p] = a}
π1 ∈ I(A) → I(A)
π1(a) ≜ a
π1(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›) ≜ xˆ1
π2 ∈ I(A) → I(A)
π2(a) ≜ a
π2(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›) ≜ xˆ2
Pr
[
xˆ Û= x
 yˆ Û= y] ≜ Pr[xˆ Û=x,yˆ Û=y]
Pr
[
yˆ Û=y
]
height ∈ I(A) → N
height(a) ≜ 0
height(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›) ≜ 1 +max(height(xˆ1), height(xˆ2))
length ∈ rpath→ B
length(·) ≜ 0
length( :: p) ≜ 1 + length(p)
bit ∈ N→ I(B)
bit(0) ≜ ‹I O›
bit(N + 1) ≜ ‹bit(N ) bit(N )›
return ∈ A→ I(A)
return(a) ≜ a
bind ∈ I(A) × (A→ I(B)) → I(B)
bind(a, f ) ≜ f (a)
bind(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›, f ) ≜ ‹bind(xˆ1,π1◦f ) bind(xˆ2,π2◦f )›
Pr
[
xˆ Û= x
]
≜
{p | length(p)=h, xˆ [p]=x }
2h
where h ≜ max(height(xˆ))
Fig. 9. Intensional Distributions
Most of the cases for the mixed semantics are structurally the same as the standard semantics.
The key differences are the handling of flipρ () and castℓ(v). For the first, the standard semantics
samples from the fresh uniform distribution immediately, while the mixed semantics produces a
single uniform distributional value. This distributional value is sampled at the evaluation of castP ,
which matches the adversary’s view.
A secret literal will produce a point distribution on that literal. The semantic operations for if, mux
and xor are lifted monadically to operate over distributions of secrets, e.g., bˆ1 ⊕ˆ bˆ2 ≜ do b1 ← bˆ1 ;
b2 ← bˆ2 ; return(b1 ⊕ b2). Other operations are as usual, e.g., let expressions and tuple elimination
reduce via substitution and are not lifted to distributions.
4.3 Capturing Correlations with Intensional Distributions
As mentioned, a distributional bit value bˆ can be viewed as a lazy interpretation of a call flipρ (). To
be sound, this interpretation must properly model conditional probabilities between variables.
Example. Consider the program let x = flipρ () in ⟨castP(x), castP(x)⟩.4After two evaluation steps
in the standard semantics, the program will be reduced to either ⟨castP(flipv(I)), castP(flipv(I))⟩ or
⟨castP(flipv(O)), castP(flipv(O))⟩, with equal probability. The standard rules for castP would then yield
(equally likely) ⟨bitvP(I), bitvP(I)⟩ and ⟨bitvP(O), bitvP(O)⟩. In the mixed semantics this program will
evaluate in two steps to ⟨castP(flipv(bˆ)), castP(flipv(bˆ))⟩ where bˆ is a distributional value. At this
point, the mixed semantics rule for castP uses monadic bind to sample bˆ to yield some b (which
is either I or O) and return it as a point distribution. The semantics needs to “remember” the bit
chosen for the first castP so that when it samples the second, the same bit is returned. Sampling
independently would yield incorrect outcomes such as ⟨bitvP(O), bitvP(I)⟩.
Intensional distributions. As shown in the upper left of Figure 9, an intensional distribution I(A)
over a set A is a binary tree with elements of A at the leaves. It represents a distribution as a
4Although this program violates affinity and would be rejected for that reason by our type system, its runtime semantics is
well-defined and serves as a helpful demonstration.
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function from input entropy—a sequence of coin flips—to a result in A. Each node ‹xˆ1 xˆ2› in the
tree represents two sets of worlds determined by the result of a coin flip: the left side xˆ1 defines the
worlds in which the coin was heads, and the right side xˆ2 defines those in which it was tails. Each
level of the tree represents a distinct coin flip, with the earliest coin flip at the root, and later coin
flips at lower levels. The height of a tree represents an upper bound on the number of coin flips
upon which a distribution’s values depends. Each path through the tree is a possible world.
For example, ‹‹3 4› ‹3 5›› is an intensional distribution of numbers in a scenario where two
coins have been flipped. There are four possible worlds. ‹3 4› is the world where the 0th coin came
up heads. 3 is the outcome in the world where both coins came up heads, while 4 is the outcome
where the 0th coin was heads but the 1th coin was tails. ‹3 5› is the world where the 0th coin came
up tails, with 3 the outcome when the 1th coin was heads, and 5 when it was tails.
We can derive the probabilities of particular outcomes by counting the number of paths that
reach them. In the example, 3 has probability 12 ; while 4 has probability
1
4 ; and 5 has probability
1
4 . Importantly, intensional distributions have enough structure to represent correlations: We can
see that we always get a 3 when the 1th coin flip is heads, regardless of whether the 0th coin flip
was heads or tails. Conversely, the distribution ‹‹3 3› ‹4 5›› ascribes outcomes 3, 4, and 5 the same
probabilities as ‹‹3 4› ‹3 5››, but represents the situation in which the we always get 3 when 0th
coin flip is heads. An equivalent representation of ‹‹3 3› ‹4 5›› is ‹3 ‹4 5››. Although the 3 only
appears once, it is logically extended to the larger sub-tree ‹3 3› for the purposes of counting. To
compute a probability, all paths are considered of a fixed length equal to the height of the tree, and
shorter sub-trees are extended to copy leaves that appear at shorter height. Trees are equal = when
they are syntactically equal modulo these extensions.
In the figure, a path p through the tree is a sequence of coin flip outcomes, either H○ or T○. The
operation xˆ[p] follows a path p through the tree xˆ going left on H○ and right on T○. When a leaf a is
reached, it is simply returned, per the case a[p]; if p happens to not be ·, returning a is tantamount
to extending the tree logically, as mentioned above. Computing the probability of an outcome x for
intensional distribution xˆ is shown at the bottom of the figure. As with the example above, it counts
the number of paths that have outcome x , scaled by the total possible worlds. The probability of an
event involving multiple distributions is similar. Conditional probability works as usual.
Finally, looking at the middle right of the figure, consider the monadic operations used by the
semantics in Figure 8. The bit(N ) operation produces a uniform distribution of bits following the
N th coin flip, where the outcomes are entirely determined by the N th flip, i.e., independent of the
flips that preceded it, which appear higher in the tree. return(a) simply returns a—this corresponds
to a point distribution of a since it is the outcome in all possible worlds (recall a[p] = a for all p).
Lastly, bind(xˆ , f ) applies f to each possible world in xˆ , gathering up the results in an intensional
distribution tree that is of equal or greater height to that of xˆ ; the height could grow if f returns a
tree larger than xˆ , and bind(xˆ , f )[p] = f (xˆ[p])[p] for all paths p.
Example revisited. Reconsider the example let x = flipρ () in ⟨castP(x), castP(x)⟩. According to the
mixed semantics starting with N = 0, flipρ () evaluates to flipv(‹I O›), which is then (as precipitated
by nstep) substituted for x in the body of the let, producing ⟨castP(flipv(‹I O›)), castP(flipv(‹I O›))⟩.
Now we apply the context rule for E[e] where E is ⟨[], castP(flipv(‹I O›))⟩ and e is castP(flipv(‹I O›)).
The rule invokes step on the latter, which performs do b ← ‹I O› ; return(σ , bitvP (return(b))) per
the rule for castP. Per the definitions of bind and return, this will return the intensional distribution
of configurations ‹(σ , bitvP (I)) (σ , bitvP (O))›. Back to the context rule, its use of bind will re-package
up these possibilities with E:
‹(σ , ⟨bitvP (I), castP(flipv(‹I O›))⟩) (σ , ⟨bitvP (O), castP(flipv(‹I O›))⟩)›
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⌈ ⌉ ∈ (exp→ I(exp)) × (store→ I(store)) × (config→ I(config)) × (trace→ I(trace))
⌈x⌉ ≜ return(x)
⌈locv(ι)⌉ ≜ return(locv(ι))
⌈bℓ⌉ ≜ return(bℓ)
⌈flipρ ()⌉ ≜ return(flipρ ())
⌈funy (x : τ ). e⌉ ≜ do e ← ⌈e⌉ ; return(funy (x : τ ). e)
⌈bitvℓ(bˆ)⌉ ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(bitvℓ(b))
⌈flipv(bˆ)⌉ ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(flipv(b))
⌈castℓ(v)⌉ ≜ do v ← ⌈v⌉ ; return(castℓ(v))
⌈mux(e1, e2, e3)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; e3 ← ⌈e3⌉ ; return(mux(e1, e2, e3))⌈xor(e1, e2)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(xor(e1, e2))⌈if(e1){e2}{e3}⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; e3 ← ⌈e3⌉ ; return(if(e1){e2}{e3})⌈ref(e1)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; return(ref(e1))⌈read(e1)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; return(read(e1))⌈write(e1, e2)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(write(e1, e2))⌈⟨e1, e2⟩⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(⟨e1, e2⟩)⌈let x = e1 in e2⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(let x = e1 in e2)⌈let x ,y = e1 in e2⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(let x ,y = e1 in e2)⌈e1(e2)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(e1(e2))
⌈⌉ ≜ return() ⌈{ι 7→ v} ⊎ σ ⌉ ≜ do v ← ⌈v⌉ ; σ ← ⌈σ ⌉ ; return({ι 7→ v} ⊎ σ )
⌈σ , e⌉ ≜ do σ ← σ ; e ← e ; return(σ , e) ⌈ϵ⌉ ≜ return(ϵ) ⌈t ·ς⌉ ≜ do t ← t ; ς ← ς ; return(t ·ς)
⌈ˆtˆ ⌉ˆ ≜ do t ← tˆ ; ⌈t⌉ ⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ ∈ I(trace) → I(trace)
Fig. 10. Mixed Semantics Projection
In this distribution of configurations there are two worlds—the left configuration occurs when
the 0th coin flip is heads, and right when it is tails. Inside of each of these configurations is a
distributional value flipv(‹I O›), where once again the left side is due to the coin flip being heads,
and the right side being tails. Both are relative to the same coin flip. As such, there are two “dead”
paths in the inner trees: the right-branch of the left distributional value, and the left branch of the
right distributional value, shown here with bullets:
‹(σ , ⟨bitvP (I), castP(flipv(‹I •›))⟩) (σ , ⟨bitvP (O), castP(flipv(‹• O›))⟩)›
The next step of the computation will force the distributional value to be I in the left branch and O
in the right branch. Here’s how. First, the definition of nstep is a bind on the above distribution
of configurations with step as the function f passed to bind. The definition of bind constructs a
new distribution tree which calls step on the left configuration, and then takes the left branch
(π1) of the tree that comes back, and likewise for the right configuration and the right branch
that comes back (π2). Here step will invoke cast and context rules similarly as before, returning
a two-element tree with bitvP (I) on the left and bitvP (O) on the right. These occurrences of π1
and π2 “pick” the left (I case) and right (O case), respectively, resulting in the final configuration
‹(σ , ⟨bitvP (I), bitvP (I)⟩) (σ , ⟨bitvP (O), bitvP (O)⟩)›
Simulation. The concept of “unreachable” paths in a distributional value is captured by a projec-
tion operation which “flattens” a distribution of mixed terms (which have distributional values)
into a distribution of standard terms (which do not have distributional values). This projection
will (1) discard unreachable paths of distributional values, and (2) corresponds to evaluation in the
standard semantics instantiated with the intensional distribution monad.
Projection is defined in Figure 10. The definition is a straightforward use of bind to recursively
flatten embedded distributional values. In our example, the projection of the mixed term before the
step shows what is left after discarding the unreachable distribution elements:
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ΨF ∈flipset ≜ ℘(I(B)) ΨB∈bitset ≜ R→℘(I(B)) Ψ∈fbsetF ΨF ,ΨB Φ∈historyF ςˆ Û= ς
(ΨF1 ,ΨB1 ) ⊎ (ΨF2 ,ΨB2 ) ≜ (ΨF1 ⊎ ΨF2 ), (ΨB1 ∪ ΨB2 )[
xˆ ⊥ yˆ
 zˆ Û= z] △⇐⇒ ∀x ,y. Pr [xˆ Û= x , yˆ Û= y  zˆ Û= z] = Pr [xˆ Û= x  zˆ Û= z] Pr [yˆ Û= y  zˆ Û= z]
Flip-Value
Pr
[
bˆ Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2 [bˆ ⊥ ΨF ,ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ})  Φ]
ΨF ,ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ Ψ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flip
ρ
BitV-P
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ bitvP (return(b)) : bit⊥P ; Γ,,
BitV-S
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ bitvS (bˆ) : bitρS ; Γ,, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}
FlipV
Ψ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ flipv(bˆ) : flipρ ; Γ, {bˆ},
LocV
Σ(ι) = τ
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ locv(ι) : τ ; Γ,,
· · ·
Ref
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′,Ψ′
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ ref(e) : ref(τ ) ; Γ′,Ψ′
Tup
Ψ ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′,Ψ1
Ψ ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′,Ψ2
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ ⟨e1, e2⟩ : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2
· · ·
Store-Empty
Ψ,Φ, Σ ⊢  ; ,
Store-Cons
Ψ ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ v : Σ(ι) ; ,Ψv
Ψ ⊎ Ψv ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
Ψ,Φ, Σ ⊢ {ι 7→ v} ⊎ σ ; Ψv ⊎ Ψσ
Ψ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψ
Config
Ψ ⊎ Ψe ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ Ψ ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ e : τ ; ,Ψe
Ψ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ ; Ψσ ⊎ Ψe
Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ
Fig. 11. Mixed Semantics Typing
⌈ˆ‹(σ , ⟨bitvP (I), castP(flipv(‹I O›))⟩) (σ , ⟨bitvP (O), castP(flipv(‹I O›))⟩)›⌉ˆ
= ‹(σ , ⟨bitvP (I), castP(flipv(I))⟩) (σ , ⟨bitvP (O), castP(flipv(O))⟩)›
and where the RHS corresponds exactly to the step of computation using the standard semantics.
We prove that the projected, mixed semantics simulates the standard semantics.
Lemma 4.2 (Simulation (Mixed)). If e is a source expression, then ⌈nstep(N ,, e)⌉ = nstepI(N ,, e).
To relate to “ground truth”, we also prove that the standard semantics using intensional distribu-
tions I simulates the standard semantics using the denotational probability monad D.
Lemma 4.3 (Simulation (Intensional)). Pr
[
nstepI(N ,, e) Û= ς
]
= Pr
[
nstepD(N ,, e) Û= ς
]
.
4.4 Mixed Semantics Typing
Our type system aims to ensure that castP will produce I and O with equal probability, meaning
neither outcome leaks information. We establish this invariant in the PMTO proof as a consequence
of type preservation for mixed terms. The mixed term typing judgment extends typing of source-
program expressions (Figure 6) with some additional elements, and considers non-source values.
The judgment has the form Ψ,Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ, and is shown at the bottom of Figure 11. Here, Σ is
a store context, which maps store locations to types; it is used to type the store σ in rules Store-Cons
and LocV as usual. Φ represents trace history which encodes the exact sequence of evaluation steps
taken to reach the present one. The type system reasons about the probability of distributional
values conditioned on this trace history having occurred. The Ψ is an fbset, which is a technical
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device used to collect all distributional bit values bˆ that appear in ς . Per the top of the figure, the
fbset is a pair (ΨF ,ΨB ), where ΨF is a flipset containing those bˆ that appear inside of flip values,
and ΨB is a bitset containing those bˆ inside bit values. The latter is a map from a region ρ to a set
of bit values in that region. The Ψ to the right of the turnstile contains all of the flip and secret bit
values in the configuration itself, while the Ψ to the left of it captures those in the context.
The expression typing judgment Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ,Ψ is similar but includes variable contexts
Γ as in the source-program type rules. We can see secret bit values being added to ΨB in the
BitV-S rule, where ΨB is the singleton map from ρ, the region of the bit value, to {bˆ}, while ΨF
is empty. Conversely, in the FlipV rule ΨB is empty while ΨF is the singleton set {bˆ}. We can see
the maintenance of Ψ to the left of the turnstile in the Tup rule. Recursively typing the pair’s left
component e1 yields fbset Ψ1 to the right of the turnstile, which is used when typing e2, and vice
versa; the Store-Cons rule similarly handles the store and the expression. The rules combine two
fbsets using the ⊎ operator. Per the top of the figure, it acts as disjoint union for flipsets but normal
union for bitsets, mirroring the handling of affine and universal variables.
The key invariants ensured by typing are defined by the judgment Ψ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ , which is
invoked by expression-typing rule FlipV and defined in the Flip-Value rule. This judgment establishes
that in a configuration reached by an execution path Φ the flip value bˆ is uniformly distributed (first
premise), and that it can be typed at region ρ because it is properly independent of the other secret
bit values in smaller regions ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ}) and flip values ΨF (second premise). Conditional
independence is defined in the figure in the usual way—the overbar notation represents some
sequence of random variables and/or condition events.
We prove a type preservation lemma to establish that these invariants are preserved.
Lemma 4.4 (Type Preservation). If e is a closed source expression, t ·ς ∈ support(nstep(N ,, e)) and
⊢ e : τ , then there exists Σ and Ψ s.t. Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ where Φ ≜
[
nstep(N ,, e) Û= t ·ς
]
.
When a configuration takes any number of step, the resulting configuration is well-typed under
new trace history Φ. Updating Φ is not arbitrary—it is necessary to satisfy a proof obligation as used
in a later lemma (PMTO (Mixed)). The new Σ and Ψ are new store typings (in case new references
were allocated), and the new fbset (in case flip values were either created or consumed). The proof
of preservation uses a sublemma which shows typesafe substitution; this lemma makes crucial use
of affinity to ensure that aggregated Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2 in contexts for compound expressions (e.g., pairs) are
truly disjoint, which will be true only because the substitution is guaranteed to only occur in Ψ1,
Ψ2, or neither, but not both.
The key property established by type preservation is that flip values remain well-typed. Recall
that the first premise of Flip-Value—uniformity—is crucial in establishing that it is safe to reveal the
flip via the castP coercion to a public bit. The second premise is crucial in re-establishing the first
premise after some other flip has been revealed. When another flip is revealed, this information
will be added to trace history, and it is not true that uniformity conditioned on the current history
Φ automatically implies uniformity in the new history Φ′; this must be proved. Because the second
premise establishes independence from all other flips, we are able restablish the first premise via
the second after some other flip is revealed to complete the proof.
4.5 Proving PMTO
To prove PMTO (Proposition 4.1) we first prove a variant of it for the mixed semantics, and then
apply a few more lemmas to show that PMTO holds for the standard semantics too.
Lemma 4.5 (PMTO (Mixed)). If e1 and e2 are closed source expressions, ⊢ e1 : τ , ⊢ e2 : τ and e1 ∼ e2 ,
then (1) nstep(N ,, e1 and nstep(N ,, e2) are defined, and (2) nstep(N ,, e1) ≈∼ nstep(N ,, e2).
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The judgment e1 ∼ e2 in the premise indicates that the two expressions are low equivalent,
meaning that the adversary cannot tell them apart. The definition of this judgment is basically
standard (given in the Appendix) and we can easily prove that it is implied by obs(e1) = obs(e2) for
source expressions (i.e., no runtime values). Mixed PMTO establishes equivalence of the distributions
of mixed configurations modulo low-equivalence. We define two distributions as equivalent modulo
an underlying equivalence relation as follows:
xˆ1 ≈∼A xˆ2
△⇐⇒ ∀x .
( ∑
x ′ |x ′∼Ax
Pr [xˆ1 Û= x ′]
)
=
( ∑
x ′ |x ′∼Ax
Pr [xˆ2 Û= x ′]
)
This definition captures the idea that two distributions are equivalent when, for any equivalence
class within the relation (represented by element x), each distribution assigns equal mass to the
whole class. For Mixed PMTO, the relation ∼A is instantiated to low equivalence, which we write
just as ∼. When the underlying relation is equality, we recover the usual notion of distribution
equivalence: equality of probability mass functions.
We prove PMTO (Mixed) by induction over steps N and then unfolding the monadic definition of
nstep(N + 1). The induction appeals to a single-step PMTO sublemma. (As mentioned in Section 4.2,
such a proof would not have been possible in the standard semantics.) To use this one-step PMTO
sublemma, it must be that the configuration at N steps is well-typed w.r.t. current trace history Φ;
we get this well-typing w.r.t. Φ from Type Preservation, discussed earlier.
A final major lemma in our PMTO proof is a notion of soundness for low-equivalence on mixed
terms, in particular, that equivalence modulo ∼ for distributions of mixed traces implies equality of
adversary-observable traces in the standard semantics:
Lemma 4.6 (Low-eqivalence Soundness). If tˆ1 ≈∼ tˆ2 then ôbs(⌈ˆtˆ1⌉ˆ) ≈= ôbs(⌈ˆtˆ2⌉ˆ).
In this lemma we use a lifting of obs for intensional distributions, written ôbs; its definition is
identical to o˜bs in Figure 7 but with the intensional distribution monad I instead of D.
We now complete the full proof of PMTO. The general strategy is to first consider two well-
typed source programs which are equal modulo adversary observation. Next, these programs
are transported to the mixed language, where low-equivalence is established. The programs are
executed in the mixed semantics, and PMTO for mixed terms is applied, which appeals to type
preservation. Due to PMTO for mixed terms, the results will be low-equivalent, and via soundness
of low-equivalence, we conclude equality of distributions modulo adversary observation after
projection. The final steps are via simulation lemmas, showing that this final projection lines up
with executions of the initial programs in the standard semantics. A detail we have elided until
now is that each semantics (standard and mixed) are defined as partial functions. They become
total under assumptions of well-typing, which we state and prove as a progress lemma.
Theorem 4.7 (PMTO).
If: e1 and e2 are closed source expressions, ⊢ e1 : τ , ⊢ e2 : τ and obs(e1) = obs(e2)
Then: (1) nstepD(N ,, e1) and nstepD(N ,, e2) are defined
And: (2) o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e1)) = o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e2)).
Proof.
(1) is by Progress (see appendix). (2) is by the following:
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obs(e1) = obs(e2)
=⇒ e1 ∼ e2 N by simple induction O
=⇒ nstep(N ,, e1) ≈∼ nstep(N ,, e2) N by PMTO (Mixed) O
=⇒ ôbs(⌈ˆnstepI(N ,, e1)⌉ˆ) ≈= ôbs(⌈ˆnstepI(N ,, e2)⌉ˆ) N by Low-equivalence Soundness O
=⇒ ôbs(nstepI(N ,, e1)) ≈= ôbs(nstepI(N ,, e2)) N by Simulation (Mixed) O
=⇒ o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e1)) = o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e2)) N by Simulation (Intensional) O
□
A detailed proof is given in the appendix via 48 proofs of lemmas and 10 figures.
5 CASE STUDY: TREE-BASED ORAM
We have implemented an interpreter and type checker for λobliv in which we have programmed a
modern tree-based ORAM [Shi et al. 2011] and a probabilistic oblivious stack [Wang et al. 2014].
This section presents our ORAM code; the Appendix considers oblivious stacks.
A tree-based ORAM [Shi et al. 2011; Stefanov et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2015] has two parts: a
tree-like structure for storing the actual data blocks, and a position map that maps logical data block
indexes to position tags that indicate the block’s position in the tree. In the simplest instantiation,
an ORAM of size N has a position map of size N which is hidden from the adversary; e.g., it could
be stored in on-chip memory in a processor-based deployment of ORAM (see Section 2.1). The
position tags mask the relationship between a logical index and the location of its corresponding
block in the tree. As blocks are read and written, they are shuffled around in the data structure,
and their new locations are recorded in the position map. The position map need not be hidden on
chip; rather, much of it can be stored recursively in ORAM itself, reducing the space overhead on
the client. As such, the tree part that contains the data blocks is called a non-recursive ORAM (or
NORAM), and the full ORAM with the position map stored within it is called a recursive ORAM.
To support implementing Tree ORAM, we extend λobliv in several ways. First, we support region
polymorphism where one may instantiate region variables with concrete regions them so long as
the substituted regions satisfy programmer-specified ordering constraints. Second, we add natural
number literals and random values; these can be encoded in λobliv as fixed-width tuples of bitv and
flipv respectively. We write them annotated with a security level, e.g., 2 S or 2 P, and write rnd R ()
to generate a random number at region R. We write natS to be the type of a secret number in region
⊥; natP for the type of a public number; R natS for the type of a secret number in the polymorphic
region R. We also write R rnd to be the type of a random natural number in the polymorphic region
R. Third, we add arrays. An array of length N can be encoded in λobliv as an N -tuple of references,
using nested if-statements to access the correct index (which must be public), and swapping out
affine contents as must be done with references. In our code examples, we write a[n] and a[n] ← e
to read and write array elements. Finally, we add records, which are like tuples but permit field
accessor notation, r . x, which only consumes the field x rather than consuming all of r (assuming x
is affine).
5.1 Non-recursive ORAM (NORAM)
We start with NORAM, which assumes an adversary-invisible position map of the same size as
the NORAM. In Section 5.2 we’ll extend this to a full recursive ORAM, which largely offloads the
position map into the ORAM itself.
Data definition. The definition of a tree-based NORAM is as follows:
type (R, R ') noram = (( R, R ') bucket) array
type (R, R ') bucket = (( R, R ') block) array
type (R, R ') block = { is_dummy : R bitS ; idx : R natS ; tag : R natS ; data : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) }
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where R ⊏ R'
A noram is an array of 2N − 1 buckets which represents a complete tree in the style of a heap data
structure: for the node at index i ∈ {0, ..., 2N − 2}, its parents, left child, and right child correspond
to the nodes at index (i − 1)/2, 2i + 1, and 2i + 2, respectively. Each bucket is an array of blocks, each
of which is a record where the data field contains the data stored in that bucket. The other three
components of the block are secret; they are (1) the is_dummy bit indicating if the block is dummy
(empty) or not; (2) the index (idx) of the block; and (3) the position tag of the block. Note that the
bucket type, ignoring the position tag, is essentially a Trivial ORAM—like the example in Figure 1(b),
it hides which index it’s really accessing by reading/writing all N of them. As with the example in
Figure 1(c), the full NORAM combines randomness (and its tree structure) to avoid having O(N )
cost for the entire map.
We choose type (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) for the data portion to illustrate that affine values can be stored
in the NORAM, and to set up our implementation of full, recursive ORAM, next.
Operations. norams do not implement read and write operations directly; these are implemented
using twomore primitive operations called noram_readAndRemove (or noram_rr, for short) and noram_add.
The former reads the designated element from noram and also removes it, while the latter adds the
designated element (overwriting any version already there). The code for noram_rr is given below;
we explain it just afterward.
1 let rec trivial_rr_h (troram : (R, R ') bucket) ( idx : R natS) ( i : natP) (acc : (R, R ') block) : (R, R ')
block =
2 if i = length(troram) then acc
3 else
4 (∗ read out the current block ∗)
5 let curr = bucket[ i ] ← (dummy_block ()) in
6 (∗ check if the current block is non−dummy, and it's index matches the queried one ∗)
7 let swap : R bitS = ! curr . is_dummy && curr.idx = idx in
8 let ( curr , acc) = mux(swap, acc, curr ) in
9 (∗ when swap is false , this equivalent to writing the data back ; otherwise , acc
10 stores the found block and is passed into the next iteration ∗)
11 let _ = bucket[ i ] ← curr in
12 trivial_rr_h troram idx ( i + 1) acc
13
14 let trivial_rr (troram : (R, R ') bucket) ( idx : R natS) : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) =
15 let ret : block = trivial_rr_h troram idx 0 (dummy_block ()) in
16 ret .data
17
18 let rec noram_rr_h (noram : (R, R ') noram) (idx : R natS) (tag : natP) ( level : natP) (acc : (R, R ') block)
: (R, R ') block =
19 (∗ compute the first index into the bucket array at depth level ∗)
20 let base : natP = (pow 2 level ) − 1 in
21 if base >= length(noram) then acc
22 else
23 let bucket_loc : natP = base + (tag & base) in (∗ the bucket on the path to access ∗)
24 let bucket = noram[bucket_loc] in
25 let acc = trivial_rr_h bucket idx 0 acc in
26 noram_rr_h noram idx tag ( level + 1) acc
27
28 let noram_rr (noram : (R, R ') noram) (idx : R natS) (tag : natP) : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) =
29 let ret = noram_rr_h noram idx tag 0 (dummy_block ()) in
30 ret .data
noram_rr takes the NORAM noram and the index idx of the desired element as arguments. The tag
argument is the position tag, which identifies a path through the noram binary tree along which
the indexed value will be stored, if present. This argument is stored secretly in a position map, but
must be revealed (via castP) prior to passing it to noram_rr because it (or derivatives of it) will be
used index the arrays that make up the NORAM, and these indexes are adversary-visible.
noram_rr works by calling noram_rr_h which recursively works its way down the identified path.
It maintains an accumulator, acc : (R, R ') block, over the course of the traversal. Initially, acc is a
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dummy block. The dummy_block () is a function call rather than a constant because the block record
contains data: (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd). This member of the record must be generated fresh for each new
block, since its contents are treated affinely. Each recursive call to noram_rr_h moves to a node the
next level down in the tree, as determined by the tag. At each node, it reads out the bucket array,
which as mentioned earlier is essentially a Trivial ORAM. The trivial_rr function calls trivial_rr_h
to iterate through the entire bucket, to obliviously read out the desired block, if present.
Notice that we are using arrays with both affine and non-affine (universal) contents in this code.
The noram type has contents which are kind U, since the type of its contents are arrays. As such,
we can read from noram without writing a new value (line 24). However, the (R, R ') bucket type has
contents which are kind A, since the type of its contents are tuples which contain type R' rnd. So,
when we index into members of values of type (R, R ') bucket we must write a dummy block (line 5).
This algorithm for noram_rr will access logN buckets (where N is the number of buckets in the
noram), and each bucket access causes a trivial_rr which takes time b where b is the size of each
bucket. Therefore, the noram_rr operation above takes timeO(b logN ). In the state-of-the-art ORAM
constructions, such as Circuit ORAM [Wang et al. 2015], b can be parameterized as a constant (e.g.,
4), which renders the overall time complexity of noram_rr to be O(logN ). This is asymptotically
faster than implementing the entire ORAM as a Trivial ORAM, which takes time O(N ).
The noram_add routine has the following signature:
val noram_add : (R, R ') noram→ ( idx : R natS) → (tag : R natS) → (data : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd)) → unit
Like the noram_rr operation, it takes an index and a position tag, but here the position tag is secret,
since it will not be examined by the algorithm. In particular, noram_add simply stores a block
consisting of the dummy bit, index, position tag, and data into the root bucket of the noram. It does
this as a Trivial ORAM operation: It iterates down the root bucket’s array similarly to trivial_rr
above, but stores the new block in the first available slot.
To avoid overflowing the root’s bucket due to repeated noram_adds, a tree-based ORAM employs
an additional eviction routine, usually called after both noram_add and noram_rr, to move blocks closer
to the leaf buckets. This routine should also maintain the key invariant: each data block should
always reside on the path from the root to the leaf corresponding to its position tag. Different
tree-based ORAM implementations differ only in their choices of b and the eviction strategies. One
simple eviction strategy picks two random nodes at each level of the tree, reads a single non-empty
block from each chosen node’s bucket, and then writes that block one level further down either to
the left or right according to the position tag; a dummy block is written in the opposite direction to
make the operation oblivious.
5.2 Recursive ORAM
To use noram to build an ORAM, we need a way to provide the position tag for calls to noram_rr and
noram_add. Such tags are stored in a position map. Such a map PM maps any index i ∈ 0..N , where
N is the capacity of ORAM, to randomly generated position tag.
An ORAM read at index i works by looking up the tag in the position map, performing an noram_rr
to read and remove the value at i , and noram_adding back that value (updating the position map
with a fresh tag). A write to i requires a noram_rr to remove the old value at i , and an noram_add to
write the new value (again updating the position map). In doing so, accessing the same index twice
will assign two uniformly independently sampled random position tags to the same data block, so
that the adversary cannot learn any information about whether the two accesses are corresponding
to the same or different indexes.
Where does the position map go? One idea is to implement it as just a regular array stored
in hidden memory, e.g., on-chip (invisible to the adversary) in a secure processor deployment of
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ORAM. However, this is not possible for MPC-based deployments, the adversary can observe the
access pattern on the map itself. To block this side channel, we can use another smaller Tree-based
ORAM to store PM. In particular, the ORAM PM has N /c blocks, where each block contains c
elements, where c ≥ 2 is a parameter of the ORAM. Therefore, PM also contains another position
map PM1, which can be stored as an ORAM of capacity N /c2. Such a construction, called recursive
ORAM, works by continuing recursively until the position map at the bottom is small enough that
it can be just a Trivial ORAM. Therefore, there are logc N norams constructed to store those position
maps, and thus the overall runtime of a recursive ORAM is logc N times of the runtime of a noram.
In the following, we implement the ORAM with c = 2.5
A recursive ORAM thus has the type oram, given below.
type (R, R ') oram = ((( R, R ') noram) array) ∗ (( R, R ') bucket)
In short, a recursive ORAM is a sequence of norams, where the first in the sequence contains the
actual data, and the remainder serve as the position map, which eventually terminate with a trivial
ORAM (the bucket at the end). The position map is like an array of size N but “stored” as a 2-D array:
array[N/2][2]. In doing so, to access PM[idx], we essentially access PM[idx/2][idx mod 2].
We implement the tree_rr as a call to the function tree_rr_h , which takes an additional public level
argument, to indicate at which point in the list of orams to start its work (initially, 0).
1 let rec tree_rr_h (oram : (R, R ') oram) ( idx : natS) ( level : natP) : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) =
2 let (norams, troram) = oram in
3 let levels : natP = length(norams) in
4 if level >= levels then trivial_rr troram idx
5 else
6 let ( r0 , r1 ) : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) = tree_rr_h oram (idx / 2) ( level + 1) in
7 let ( r0 ', tag) = mux(idx % 2 = 0, rnd R' () , r0 ) in
8 let ( r1 ', tag) = mux(idx % 2 = 1, tag , r1 ) in
9 let _ = tree_add_h oram (idx / 2) ( level + 1) ( r0 ', r1 ') in
10 noram_rr norams[level] idx (castP tag)
11
12 let tree_rr (oram : (R, R ') oram) ( idx : natS) : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) =
13 tree_rr_h oram idx 0
Line 4 checks for the base case of the recursion, in which case we lookup idx in the troram,
returning back a (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) pair. Otherwise, we enter the recursive case. Line 6 reads out
PM[idx/2], and lines 7 and 8 obliviously read out PM[idx/2][idx mod 2] into tag, replacing it with a
freshly generated tag, to satisfy the affinity requirement. Line 9 writes the updated block PM[idx/2]
back (i.e., ( r0 ', r1 ') ), using an analogous tree_add_h routine, for which a level can be specified. Finally,
line 10 reveals the retrieved position tag for index idx, so that it can be passed to noram_rr. Level 0
corresponds to the actual data of the ORAM, which is returned to the client.
The tree_add routine is similar so we do not show it all. As with tree_rr it recursively adds the
corresponding bits of the position tag into the array of norams. At each level of the recursion there
is a snippet like the following:
1 let new_tag : R' rnd = rnd R' () in
2 let sec_tag = castS new_tag in (∗ does NOT consume new_tag ∗)
3 let ( r0 , r1 ) : (R' rnd) ∗ (R' rnd) = tree_rr_h oram (idx / 2) ( level + 1) in
4 let r0 ', tag = mux (idx % 2 = 0, new_tag, r0 ) in (∗ replaces with new tag ∗)
5 let r1 ', tag = mux (idx % 2 = 1, tag , r1 ) in
6 let _ = tree_add_h oram (idx / 2) ( level + 1) ( r0 ', r1 ') in
7 noram_add norams[level] idx sec_tag data (∗ adds to Tree ORAM ∗)
Lines 1 and 2 generate a new tag, and make a secret copy of it. The new tag is then stored in the
recursive ORAM—lines 3–5 are similar to tree_add_h but replace the found tag with new_tag, not
some garbage value, at the appropriate level of the position map (line 6). Finally, sec_tag is used to
store the data in the appropriate level of the noram.
5We present a readable, almost-correct version of the code first, and then clarify the remaining issue at the end.
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The astute reader may have noticed that the code snippet for addwill not type check. In particular,
the sec_tag argument has type R' natS but noram_add requires it to have type R natS. This is because
the position tags for the noram at level are stored as the data of the noram at level + 1, and these are
in different regions. We cannot put them in the same region because we require a single noram’s
metadata to have a strictly smaller region than its data (i.e. the R ⊏ R′ constraint on the block type).
We can “solve” this problem by unrolling the oram type definition to fixed list of levels
type (R, R1, R2, ..., RN_1, RN) oram = (R, R1) noram ∗ (R1,R2) noram ∗ ... ∗ (RN_1, RN) bucket
We would likewise have to unroll the corresponding tree_add, tree_rr procedures. Now, each level
is properly ordered with the next. We speculate that a more pleasing solution, that involves no
duplication of the code, could involve a recursively-defined (dependent) type, e.g.,
type oram = fix f => fun rs => match rs with
| [R;R1;R2] => (R,R1) noram ∗ (R1,R2) bucket
| [R;R1;R2 ]:: rs ' => (R,R1) noram ∗ ( f [R2 ]:: rs ')
Then, a three-level recursive ORAM would have type oram [R;R1;R2;R3].
Oblivious Stacks. Other oblivious data structures can be built in λobliv, and on top of noram in
particular. Appendix A.1 presents a development of probabilistic oblivious stacks, along with some
additional technical challenges they present.
6 RELATEDWORK
Lampson first pointed out various covert, or “side,” channels of information leakage during a
program’s execution [Lampson 1973]. Defending against side-channel leakage is challenging.
Previous works have attempted to thwart such leakage from various angles. Processor architectures
thatmitigate leakage through timing [Kocher et al. 2004; Liu et al. 2012], power consumption [Kocher
et al. 2004], or memory-traces [Fletcher et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2015a; Maas et al. 2013; Ren et al.
2013]. Program analysis techniques that formally ensure that a program has bounded or no leakage
through instruction traces [Molnar et al. 2006], timing channels [Agat 2000; Molnar et al. 2006; Russo
et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2012, 2015], or memory traces [Liu et al. 2015a, 2013, 2014]. Algorithmic
techniques that transform programs and algorithms to their side-channel-mitigating or side-channel-
free counterparts while introducing only mild costs – e.g., works on mitigating timing channel
leakage [Askarov et al. 2010; Barthe et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2011], and on preventing memory-trace
leakage [Blanton et al. 2013; Eppstein et al. 2010; Goldreich 1987; Goldreich and Ostrovsky 1996;
Goodrich et al. 2012; Shi et al. 2011; Stefanov et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2015, 2014; Zahur and Evans
2013]. Often, the most effective and efficient is through a comprehensive co-design approach
combining these areas of advances – in fact, several aforementioned works indeed combine (a
subset of) algorithms, architecture, and programming language techniques [Fletcher et al. 2014;
Liu et al. 2015a; Ren et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2012, 2015].
Our core language not only generalizes a line of prior works on timing channel security [Agat
2000], program counter security [Molnar et al. 2006], and memory-trace obliviousness [Liu et al.
2015a, 2013, 2014], but it is also the first to soundly capture the essence of memory-trace oblivi-
ousness without treating key mechanisms—notably, the use of randomness—as a black box. Thus
we can express state-of-the-art algorithmic results and formally reason about the security of their
implementations, building a bridge between algorithmic and programming language techniques.
ObliVM [Liu et al. 2015b] is a language for programming oblivious algorithms intended to be
run as secure multiparty computations [Yao 1986]. Its type system also employs affine types to
ensure random numbers are used at most once. However, there it provides no mechanism to
disallow constructing a non-uniformly distributed random number. When such random numbers
are generated, they can be distinguished by an attacker from uniformly distributed random numbers
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when being revealed. Therefore, the type system in ObliVM does not guarantee obliviousness.
λobliv’s use of probability regions enforces that all random numbers are uniformly random, and
thus eliminates this channel of information leakage. Moreover, we prove that this mechanism (and
the others in λobliv) are sufficient to prove PMTO. For programs which are PMTO but temporarily
violate uniformity, probabilistic program verification [Barthe et al. 2018a] provides a mechanism
for discharging proof obligations (of uniformity) introduced by unsafe casts.
Our work belongs to a large category of work that aims to statically enforce noninterference,
e.g., by typing [Sabelfeld and Myers 2006; Volpano et al. 1996]. Liu et al. [2015a, 2013] developed a
type system that ensures programs are MTO. In their system, types are extended to indicate where
values are allocated; as per our above example data can be public or secret, but can also reside in
ORAM. Trace events are extended to model ORAM accesses as opaque to the adversary (similar to
the Dolev-Yao modeling of encrypted messages [Dolev and Yao 1981]): the adversary knows that
an access occurred, but not the address or whether it was a read or a write. Liu et al’s type system
enforces obliviousness of deterministic programs that use (assumed-to-be-correct) ORAM.
Our probabilistic memory trace obliviousness property bears some resemblance to probabilistic
notions of noninterference. Much prior work [Ngo et al. 2014; Russo and Sabelfeld 2006; Sabelfeld
and Sands 2000; Smith 2003] is concerned with how random choices made by a thread scheduler
could cause the distribution of visible events to differ due to the values of secrets. Here, the source
of nondeterminism is the (external) scheduler, rather than the program itself, as in our case. Smith
and Alpízar [2006, 2007] consider how the influence of random numbers may affect the likelihood
of certain outcomes, mostly being concerned with termination channels. Their programming model
is not as rich as ours, as a secret random number is never permitted to be made public; such an
ability is the main source of complexity in λobliv, and is crucial for supporting oblivious algorithms.
Some prior work aims to quantify the information released by a (possibly randomized) program
(e.g., Köpf and Rybalchenko [2013]; Mu and Clark [2009]) according to entropy-based measures.
Work on verifying the correctness of differentially private algorithms [Barthe et al. 2013; Zhang and
Kifer 2017; Zhang et al. 2019], essentially aims to bound possible leakage; by contrast, we enforce
that no information leaks due to a program’s execution.
Our intensional distributions—while a novel syntactic device instrumental to our proof approach—
are readily interpretable as measurable sets over infinite streams of bits, and there is prior work
which has considered such models such as Kozen’s seminal treatment [Kozen 1979] among oth-
ers [Huang and Morrisett 2016; Park et al. 2008; Ramsey and Pfeffer 2002b; Ścibior et al. 2015].
There is a rich history for reasoning about probabilistic programs [Sato et al. 2019], in particular
relational properties [Barthe et al. 2014, 2017b; Hsu 2017] and program logics [Barthe et al. 2018b;
Rand and Zdancewic 2015], including trace properties [Smith et al. 2019], privacy properties [Barthe
et al. 2015; Gaboardi et al. 2013; Reed and Pierce 2010], obliviousness properties [Ohrimenko et al.
2016], and uniformity and independence [Barthe et al. 2017a]. Much of this work is focused on
verification techniques for some program of interest, and not on proof techniques for establishing
metatheoric properties of entire languages (e.g., via a type system). While in principle the work
mentioned above could apply to our setting, none would enable our small-step, subject-reduction-
style proof, for which our intensional distribution construction offers a unique solution.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented λobliv, a core language suitable for expressing computations whose
execution should be oblivious to a powerful adversary who can observe an execution’s trace of
instructions and memory accesses, but not see private values. Unlike prior formalisms, λobliv can be
used to express probabilistic algorithms whose security depends crucially on the use of randomness.
To do so, λobliv tracks the use of randomly generated numbers via a substructural (affine) type
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system, and employs a novel concept called probability regions. The latter are used to track a random
number’s probabilistic (in)dependence on other random numbers. We have proved that together
these mechanisms ensure that a random number’s revelation in the visible trace does not perturb
the distribution of possible events so as to make secrets more likely. We have demonstrated that
λobliv’s type system is powerful enough to accept sophisticated algorithms, including forms of
oblivious RAMs. Such data structures were out of the reach of prior type systems. As such, our
proof-of-concept implementations represent the first automated proofs that these algorithms are
secure. Nevertheless, while λobliv advances the state of the art in security type systems, there are
still oblivious algorithms it is not powerful enough to check. We believe that a promising way
forward is to integrate λobliv’s type-level mechanisms with richer systems for formal reasoning,
e.g., as done in RustBelt [Jung et al. 2018] or Fuzzi [Zhang et al. 2019].
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Aseem Rastogi and Kesha Heitala for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and Elaine
Shi for helpful suggestions and comments on the work while it was underway. This material is
based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Nos. CNS-1563722,
CNS-1314857, and CNS-1111599, and by DARPA under contracts FA8750-15-2-0104 and FA8750-16-
C-0022. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
REFERENCES
Johan Agat. 2000. Transforming out Timing Leaks. In POPL.
Aslan Askarov, Danfeng Zhang, and Andrew C. Myers. 2010. Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels. In CCS.
Henry G. Baker. 1992. Lively Linear Lisp: &Ldquo;Look Ma, No Garbage!&Rdquo;. SIGPLAN Not. 27, 8 (Aug. 1992), 89–98.
https://doi.org/10.1145/142137.142162
Gilles Barthe, Thomas Espitau, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grégoire, Justin Hsu, and Pierre-Yves Strub. 2018a. An Assertion-
Based Program Logic for Probabilistic Programs. In Programming Languages and Systems, Amal Ahmed (Ed.). Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 117–144.
Gilles Barthe, Thomas Espitau, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grégoire, Justin Hsu, and Pierre-Yves Strub. 2018b. An Assertion-
Based Program Logic for Probabilistic Programs. In Programming Languages and Systems, Amal Ahmed (Ed.). Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 117–144.
Gilles Barthe, Thomas Espitau, Benjamin Gr\’egoire, Justin Hsu, and Pierre-Yves Strub. 2017a. Proving uniformity and
independence by self-composition and coupling. In LPAR-21. 21st International Conference on Logic for Programming,
Artificial Intelligence and Reasoning (EPiC Series in Computing), Thomas Eiter and David Sands (Eds.), Vol. 46. EasyChair,
385–403. https://doi.org/10.29007/vz48
Gilles Barthe, Cédric Fournet, Benjamin Grégoire, Pierre-Yves Strub, Nikhil Swamy, and Santiago Zanella-Béguelin. 2014.
Probabilistic Relational Verification for Cryptographic Implementations. In Proceedings of the 41st ACM SIGPLAN-
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 193–205. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2535838.2535847
Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesús Gallego Arias, Justin Hsu, Aaron Roth, and Pierre-Yves Strub. 2015. Higher-order
approximate relational refinement types for mechanism design and differential privacy. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, Vol. 50.
ACM, 55–68.
Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Justin Hsu, and Pierre-Yves Strub. 2017b. Coupling Proofs Are Probabilistic Product
Programs. In Proceedings of the 44th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL 2017).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 161–174. https://doi.org/10.1145/3009837.3009896
Gilles Barthe, Boris Köpf, Federico Olmedo, and Santiago Zanella Béguelin. 2013. Probabilistic Relational Reasoning for
Differential Privacy. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 35, 3 (2013), 9:1–9:49.
Gilles Barthe, Tamara Rezk, Alejandro Russo, and Andrei Sabelfeld. 2010. Security of multithreaded programs by compilation.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 13, 3 (2010), 21.
Marina Blanton, Aaron Steele, and Mehrdad Alisagari. 2013. Data-oblivious Graph Algorithms for Secure Computation and
Outsourcing. In ASIA CCS.
David Brumley and Dan Boneh. 2003. Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical. In USENIX Security.
A Language for Probabilistically Oblivious Computation 1:27
D. Dolev and A. C. Yao. 1981. On the Security of Public Key Protocols. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (SFCS).
Maryam Emami, Rakesh Ghiya, and Laurie J. Hendren. 1994. Context-sensitive Interprocedural Points-to Analysis in the
Presence of Function Pointers. In PLDI.
David Eppstein, Michael T. Goodrich, and Roberto Tamassia. 2010. Privacy-preserving data-oblivious geometric algorithms
for geographic data. In GIS.
Matthias Felleisen and Robert Hieb. 1992. The revised report on the syntactic theories of sequential control and state.
Theoretical computer science 103, 2 (1992), 235–271.
Christopher W. Fletcher, Ling Ren, Xiangyao Yu, Marten van Dijk, Omer Khan, and Srinivas Devadas. 2014. Suppressing the
Oblivious RAM timing channel while making information leakage and program efficiency trade-offs. In HPCA.
Marco Gaboardi, Andreas Haeberlen, Justin Hsu, Arjun Narayan, and Benjamin C Pierce. 2013. Linear dependent types for
differential privacy. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, Vol. 48. ACM, 357–370.
Michèle Giry. 1982. A categorical approach to probability theory. In Categorical Aspects of Topology and Analysis, B. Ba-
naschewski (Ed.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 68–85.
J.A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. 1982. Security policy and security models. In IEEE S & P.
O. Goldreich. 1987. Towards a theory of software protection and simulation by oblivious RAMs. In STOC.
O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. 1987. How to play ANY mental game. In STOC.
Oded Goldreich and Rafail Ostrovsky. 1996. Software protection and simulation on oblivious RAMs. J. ACM (1996).
Michael T. Goodrich, Olga Ohrimenko, and Roberto Tamassia. 2012. Data-Oblivious Graph Drawing Model and Algorithms.
CoRR abs/1209.0756 (2012).
Matt Hoekstra. 2015. Intel SGX for Dummies (Intel SGX Design Objectives). https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2013/
09/26/protecting-application-secrets-with-intel-sgx.
Justin Hsu. 2017. Probabilistic Couplings for Probabilistic Reasoning. CoRR abs/1710.09951 (2017). arXiv:1710.09951
http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09951
Daniel Huang and Greg Morrisett. 2016. An Application of Computable Distributions to the Semantics of Probabilistic
Programming Languages. In Programming Languages and Systems, Peter Thiemann (Ed.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 337–363.
Mohammad Islam, Mehmet Kuzu, and Murat Kantarcioglu. 2012. Access Pattern disclosure on Searchable Encryption:
Ramification, Attack and Mitigation. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS).
Ralf Jung, Jacques-Henri Jourdan, Robbert Krebbers, and Derek Dreyer. 2018. RustBelt: Securing the Foundations of the
Rust Programming Language. Proc. ACM Program. Lang. POPL (2018).
Paul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, , Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan
Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael Schwarz, and Yuval Yarom. 2019. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution.
In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P).
Paul Kocher, Ruby Lee, Gary McGraw, and Anand Raghunathan. 2004. Security As a New Dimension in Embedded System
Design. In Proceedings of the 41st Annual Design Automation Conference (DAC ’04). 753–760. Moderator-Ravi, Srivaths.
Paul C. Kocher. 1996. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In CRYPTO.
Boris Köpf and Andrey Rybalchenko. 2013. Automation of quantitative information-flow analysis. In Formal Methods for
Dynamical Systems.
Dexter Kozen. 1979. Semantics of Probabilistic Programs. In Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (SFCS ’79). IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 101–114. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1979.
38
Butler W. Lampson. 1973. A Note on the Confinement Problem. Commun. ACM (1973).
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stefan Mangard,
Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, and Mike Hamburg. 2018. Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User
Space. In USENIX Security.
Chang Liu, Austin Harris, Martin Maas, Michael Hicks, Mohit Tiwari, and Elaine Shi. 2015a. GhostRider: A Hardware-
Software System for Memory Trace Oblivious Computation. In ASPLOS.
Chang Liu, Michael Hicks, and Elaine Shi. 2013. Memory Trace Oblivious Program Execution. In CSF.
Chang Liu, Yan Huang, Elaine Shi, Jonathan Katz, and Michael Hicks. 2014. Automating Efficient RAM-Model Secure
Computation. In IEEE S & P.
Chang Liu, Xiao Shaun Wang, Kartik Nayak, Yan Huang, and Elaine Shi. 2015b. ObliVM: A Programming Framework for
Secure Computation. In IEEE S & P.
Isaac Liu, Jan Reineke, David Broman, Michael Zimmer, and Edward A. Lee. 2012. A PRET microarchitecture implementation
with repeatable timing and competitive performance. In ICCD.
Martin Maas, Eric Love, Emil Stefanov, Mohit Tiwari, Elaine Shi, Kriste Asanovic, John Kubiatowicz, and Dawn Song. 2013.
Phantom: Practical Oblivious Computation in a Secure Processor. In CCS.
1:28 David Darais, Ian Sweet, Chang Liu, and Michael Hicks
David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz, and David Wagner. 2006. The Program Counter Security Model: Automatic
Detection and Removal of Control-flow Side Channel Attacks. In ICISC.
David Monniaux. 2000. Abstract Interpretation of Probabilistic Semantics. In Seventh International Static Analysis Symposium
(SAS’00) (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Springer Verlag, 322–339. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45099-3_17
Chunyan Mu and David Clark. 2009. An abstraction quantifying information flow over probabilistic semantics. InWorkshop
on Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages (QAPL).
Tri Minh Ngo, Mariëlle Stoelinga, and Marieke Huisman. 2014. Effective verification of confidentiality for multi-threaded
programs. Journal of computer security 22, 2 (2014).
Olga Ohrimenko, Felix Schuster, Cédric Fournet, Aastha Mehta, Sebastian Nowozin, Kapil Vaswani, and Manuel Costa. 2016.
Oblivious Multi-party Machine Learning on Trusted Processors. In Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Conference on Security
Symposium (SEC’16). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 619–636. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3241094.
3241143
Sungwoo Park, Frank Pfenning, and Sebastian Thrun. 2008. A Probabilistic Language Based on Sampling Functions. ACM
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 31, 1, Article 4 (Dec. 2008), 46 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/1452044.1452048
Norman Ramsey and Avi Pfeffer. 2002a. Stochastic Lambda Calculus and Monads of Probability Distributions. In POPL.
Norman Ramsey and Avi Pfeffer. 2002b. Stochastic Lambda Calculus and Monads of Probability Distributions. In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL ’02). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 154–165. https://doi.org/10.1145/503272.503288
Robert Rand and Steve Zdancewic. 2015. VPHL. Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 319, C (Dec. 2015), 351–367. https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2015.12.021
Jason Reed and Benjamin C Pierce. 2010. Distance makes the types grow stronger: a calculus for differential privacy. ACM
Sigplan Notices 45, 9 (2010), 157–168.
Ling Ren, Xiangyao Yu, Christopher W. Fletcher, Marten van Dijk, and Srinivas Devadas. 2013. Design space exploration
and optimization of path oblivious RAM in secure processors. In ISCA.
Alejandro Russo, John Hughes, David A. Naumann, and Andrei Sabelfeld. 2006. Closing Internal Timing Channels by
Transformation. In Annual Asian Computing Science Conference (ASIAN).
Alejandro Russo and Andrei Sabelfeld. 2006. Securing interaction between threads and the scheduler. In CSF-W.
A. Sabelfeld and A. C. Myers. 2006. Language-based Information-flow Security. IEEE J.Sel. A. Commun. 21, 1 (Sept. 2006).
Andrei Sabelfeld and David Sands. 2000. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In CSF-W.
Tetsuya Sato, Alejandro Aguirre, Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Deepak Garg, and Justin Hsu. 2019. Formal Verifica-
tion of Higher-order Probabilistic Programs: Reasoning About Approximation, Convergence, Bayesian Inference, and
Optimization. Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 3, POPL, Article 38 (Jan. 2019), 30 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3290351
Adam Ścibior, Zoubin Ghahramani, and Andrew D. Gordon. 2015. Practical Probabilistic Programming with Monads.
In Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Haskell (Haskell ’15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 165–176.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2804302.2804317
Elaine Shi, T.-H. Hubert Chan, Emil Stefanov, and Mingfei Li. 2011. Oblivious RAM with O ((logN )3)Worst-Case Cost. In
ASIACRYPT.
Calvin Smith, Justin Hsu, and Aws Albarghouthi. 2019. Trace Abstraction Modulo Probability. Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 3,
POPL, Article 39 (Jan. 2019), 31 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3290352
Geoffrey Smith. 2003. Probabilistic noninterference through weak probabilistic bisimulation. In CSF-W.
Geoffrey Smith and Rafael Alpízar. 2006. Secure Information Flow with Random Assignment and Encryption. In Workshop
on Formal Methods in Security (FMSE).
Geoffrey Smith and Rafael Alpízar. 2007. Fast Probabilistic Simulation, Nontermination, and Secure Information Flow. In
PLAS.
Emil Stefanov, Marten van Dijk, Elaine Shi, Christopher Fletcher, Ling Ren, Xiangyao Yu, and Srinivas Devadas. 2013. Path
ORAM – an Extremely Simple Oblivious RAM Protocol. In CCS.
G. Edward Suh, Dwaine Clarke, Blaise Gassend, Marten van Dijk, and Srinivas Devadas. 2003. AEGIS: architecture for
tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing. In ICS.
David Lie Chandramohan Thekkath, Mark Mitchell, Patrick Lincoln, Dan Boneh, John Mitchell, and Mark Horowitz. 2000.
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 34, 5 (Nov. 2000).
Jo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin, Baris Kasikci, Frank Piessens, Mark Silberstein, Thomas F.
Wenisch, Yuval Yarom, and Raoul Strackx. 2018. Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with
Transient Out-of-order Execution. In USENIX Security.
Dennis Volpano, Cynthia Irvine, and Geoffrey Smith. 1996. A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysis. J. Comput.
Secur. 4, 2-3 (Jan. 1996).
Xiao Wang, Hubert Chan, and Elaine Shi. 2015. Circuit ORAM: On tightness of the Goldreich-Ostrovsky lower bound. In
CCS.
A Language for Probabilistically Oblivious Computation 1:29
Xiao Shaun Wang, Kartik Nayak, Chang Liu, T-H. Hubert Chan, Elaine Shi, Emil Stefanov, and Yan Huang. 2014. Oblivious
Data Structures. In CCS.
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. 1986. How to generate and exchange secrets. In FOCS.
Samee Zahur and David Evans. 2013. Circuit Structures for Improving Efficiency of Security and Privacy Tools. In S & P.
Danfeng Zhang, Aslan Askarov, and Andrew C. Myers. 2011. Predictive Mitigation of Timing Channels in Interactive
Systems. In CCS.
Danfeng Zhang, Aslan Askarov, and Andrew C. Myers. 2012. Language-based Control and Mitigation of Timing Channels.
In PLDI.
Danfeng Zhang and Daniel Kifer. 2017. LightDP: Towards Automating Differential Privacy Proofs. In POPL.
Danfeng Zhang, Yao Wang, G. Edward Suh, and Andrew C. Myers. 2015. A Hardware Design Language for Timing-Sensitive
Information-Flow Security. In ASPLOS.
Hengchu Zhang, Edo Roth, Andreas Haeberlen, Benjamin C. Pierce, and Aaron Roth. 2019. Fuzzi: A Three-Level Logic for
Differential Privacy. CoRR abs/1905.12594 (2019). arXiv:1905.12594 http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.12594
Xiaotong Zhuang, Tao Zhang, and Santosh Pande. 2004. HIDE: an infrastructure for efficiently protecting information
leakage on the address bus. SIGARCH Comput. Archit. News 32, 5 (Oct. 2004).
1:30 David Darais, Ian Sweet, Chang Liu, and Michael Hicks
1 type (R, R ') stack = (( R, R ') oram) ∗ natS ref
2 type (R, R ') oram = ((( R, R ') noram) array) ∗ (( R, R ') bucket)
3 type (R, R ') noram = (( R, R ') bucket) array
4 type (R, R ') bucket = (( R, R ') block) array
5 type (R, R ') block = { is_dummy : R bit ; idx : R natS ; tag : R natS ;
data : natS ∗ (R' rnd) }
6 where R ⊏ R'
7
8 let stackop (( oram, rid_r ) : (R, R ') stack ) ( ispush : bitS ) (d : natS) :
natS =
9 let rid = ! rid_r in
10 let old_d = tree_rr oram rid in
11 let (d ', _) = mux(ispush, d, old_d) in
12 let ( id , _) = mux(ispush, rid + 1, rid ) in
13 tree_add oram id d ';
14 let ( rid ', _) = mux(ispush, rid + 1, rid − 1) in
15 rid_r := rid '; d '
Fig. 12. A deterministic oblivious stack built using a full (recursive) ORAM.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Case Study: Oblivious Stacks
This section considers an oblivious data structure, an oblivious stack. The goal of an oblivious stack
is to hide both its data and which operations (pushes or pops) are taking place—only the total
number of operations should be revealed. To do this, we could implement the stack using an ORAM
rather than a normal (encrypted) array, and we could merge the code for push and pop so as to
mask which operation is taking place (despite knowledge of the PC). Code to do this is shown in
the stackop function in Figure 12.
In the code, a stack consists of an ORAM of secret numbers and a reference storing the index of
the root. Function stackop takes a stack, a flag indicating whether the operation is a push or pop,
and the value to push, and returns a value. The code reads the value at the root index (line 10). The
next line copies that value to d ' if the operation is pop, or else puts d there if it is a push. Line 12
determines the index of the write it will perform on line 13: this index (id) is one more than the
root index if it’s a push; it’s the current root index if not. As such, the write on line 13 puts the
given value in the next slot in case of a push, or writes back the value at the current root, if it’s a
pop. Finally, line 14 adjusts the root index, and line 15 returns the result, which is either the popped
value or pushed value (if it was a push).
While this code works perfectly well, a probabilistic version of the stack, using a non-recursive
ORAM would be more space-efficient. In particular, it will require only O(L) extra space where L is
the current size of the stack, whereas this version requiresO(N ) extra space, where N is the size of
the ORAM. To see how, consider that we always access a stack via its head, using the root index.
Thus, in the code in Figure 12, the full oram internally only ever uses one slot in its position map.
Thus we can do better by using an NORAM directly, having the stack manage the position tag of
the root. In short, we implement an oblivious stack as a triple comprising a NORAM, the index of
the root element, and its position tag. The latter two act as a kind of pointer into the NORAM. Each
block stored in the NORAM contains the data and the position tag of the next block in the stack.
Code implementing the stack following this design is given in Figure 13. Note the code branches on
the ispush variable to make it easier to read; the actual implementation must use muxs to conditionally
execute each statement in both branches to ensure obliviousness.6 Line 8 extracts the current root
index and position tag. Lines 11–15 handle a push operation. Line 11 first does a “dummy read” from
the NORAM; just as we saw with the trivial ORAM add earlier, using index −1 results in a dummy
block being returned (the position tag argument is unimportant in this case). Line 12 constructs
6Notice that the structure of both branches is roughly parallel, which makes converting to the use ofmuxes straightforward.
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1 type (R, R ') ostack = (( R, R ') noram) ∗ natS ref ∗ (R' rnd) ref
2 type (R, R ') noram = (( R, R ') bucket) array
3 type (R, R ') bucket = (( R, R ') block) array
4 type (R, R ') block = { is_dummy : R bit ; idx : R natS ; tag : R natS ; data
: natS ∗ (R' rnd) }
5 where R ⊏ R'
6
7 let stackop (( noram, rid_r ,pos_r) : ostack) ( ispush : bitS ) (d : natS) : natS
=
8 let ( rid , pos) = ! rid_r , !pos_r in
9 let ( rid ', pos ', d ') =
10 if ispush then
11 let (d ', _) = noram_rr noram (−1) (castP (rnd R' () ) ) in
12 let b = (d, pos) in
13 let pos ' = rnd R' () in
14 let _ = noram_add noram (rid + 1) (castS pos ') b in
15 ( rid + 1, pos ', d ')
16 else
17 let (d ', pos ') = noram_rr noram rid (castP pos) in
18 let b = (d, rnd R' () ) in
19 let _ = noram_add noram (−1) 0 b in
20 ( rid − 1, pos ', d ') in
21 rid_r := rid ';
22 rpos_r := pos ';
23 d '
Fig. 13. A probabilistic oblivious stack built using a non-recursive ORAM. (Does not use mux, for simplicity.)
1 let stackop (( noram, rid_r , pos_r) : (R, R ') ostack) ( ispush : bitS ) (d : natS)
: natS =
2 let ( rid , pos) = ! rid_r , !pos_r in
3 let ( rid ', pos ', d ') =
4 let ( id , new_rid) = mux(ispush, −1, rid + 1) in
5 let ( to_cast_p , tmp) = mux(ispush, rnd R' () , pos) in
6 let (d ', pos ') = noram_rr noram id (castP to_cast_p) in
7 let (pos ', _) = mux(ispush, rnd R' () , pos ')
8 let b = (d, tmp) in
9 let (pos_S, _) = mux(ispush, pos ', 0)
10 let _ = noram_add noram new_rid (castS pos_S) b in
11 let ( ret_rid , _) = mux(ispush, rid_r − 1, rid_r + 1) in
12 ( ret_id , pos ', d ') in rid_r := rid ';
13 rpos_r := pos ';
14 d '
Fig. 14. A probabilistic oblivious stack built using a non-recursive ORAM using mux.
a new block b to push: it consists of the given data d paired with the current root’s position tag
pos, thus creating a “pointer” to that block. We then generate a fresh position tag pos ' for this (the
new root’s) block, add the block to the noram. The coercion castP ascribes a random number the
type natP (per line 11), while castS gives it type natS (line 14). The new root index (the old one plus
one), the root’s tag, and the dummy block passed in are returned on line 15. Lines 17–20 handle a
pop. Here, the first rr does real work, extracting the block that corresponds to the root index and
position tag. We then generate a dummy block to “add” to the ORAM. The updated root index (the
old one minus one), its position tag (returned by the rr) and the fetched block are returned. The full
mux version is provided in Figure 14.
This version of an oblivious stack performs better than the version from Figure 12. The space
overhead, due to the added pointers at the root and within the ORAM, isO(L) where L is the size of
the current stack, not the size N of the ORAM. The running time is still O(loдN ). Obliviousness is
a direct corollary of implementing our stack on λobliv: Because we have labeled the stack’s contents
and root as secret, as well as the choice of operation, nothing can be learned about any of them
when observing the event trace.
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A.2 The Limits of Syntactic Uniformity Enforcement
Unfortunately, we cannot directly typecheck an implementation of oblivious stacks. To see why,
consider the type of block of Section 5.1. In this type we assume that the position tag field is in region
R and that this region is strictly less than R', the region associated with random values stored inside
the NORAM. However, in the code for oblivious stacks, we are storing random numbers in region
R' that we will later use as the position tag for subsequent operations. So, it is clearly not the case
that the strict ordering constraint is satisfied. Suppose we change to the type for blocks thus:
type (R, R ') block = { is_dummy : R bitS ; idx : R natS ; tag : R' natS ; data : (rnd R' ∗ rnd R ') }
where R ⊏ R'
Here, we place the position tag in region R' instead. This almost works – since the tag argument
is public in noram_rr and noram_add operations only mux on the index (in the trivial write to the root
bucket). However, the eviction procedure will not typecheck with the position tag at region R'.
This is because the eviction procedure performs a mux on the secret position tag (in R') to decide
where to evict a block (with the data component also in R'). Thus, the strict ordering requirement
(R′ ⊏ R′) for the mux type rule is not met. The fundamental issue is that we are storing position
tags in the ORAM, so the region associated with position tags of the ORAM are the same as the
regions of the data in the ORAM.
Our type system rejects themux in the eviction procedure (when position tags are typed at region
R') because it does yield random values which are not uniformly distributed. However, this violation
is actually a false positive. By the time these random values are revealed to the adversary, their
uniformity is re-established. This is obviously the case, because if the ORAM truly implements a
map, the result of reading from the ORAM on line 17 (Figure 13) of stackop will yield the same value
that was placed into it. This value was a fresh random value, which is uniformly distributed. The
following simple, pathological case illustrates the issue:
1 let s = I S in (∗ A secret true bit ∗)
2 let ( r0 , r1 ) = ( flip R0 () , flip R1 () ) in
3 let r0_s = castS r0 in
4 let g = s && r0_s in
5 let (v1 , v2) = mux (g, r0 , r1 ) in
6 let (v , _) = mux (g, v1 , v2) in
7 castP v
This example flips two coins and uses them as the arguments to the mux on line 5. Since the
guard of thismux depends on the value of r0 the resulting values v1, v2 are not uniformly distributed.
Indeed, the type system would reject the mux on line 5. However, the mux on line 6 yields another
value v which is again uniformly distributed and thus safe to reveal. The takeaway here is that a
sequence of appropriate muxes can temporarily perturb and then re-establish the uniformity of a
random value before revealing it to the adversary. Since our type system forces random values to
be uniform everywhere, we cannot typecheck instances like this.
We can easily handle this case with the use of unsafe casts – castNU and castU for cast “non-
uniform” and cast “uniform” respectively. This allows a value to be labeled as intentionally non-
uniform. While a value is marked as non-uniform, the mux operations over these values will not be
checked for strict ordering. However, it is the programmer’s responsibility to ensure at the point
that it is casted back into a random value (using castU) that it is truly a random value. For example,
we could patch the code above as follows:
1 let s = I S in (∗ A secret true bit ∗)
2 let ( r0 , r1 ) = ( flip R0 () , flip R1 () ) in
3 let r0_s = castS r0 in
4 let g = s && r0_s in
5 let (v1 , v2) = mux (g, (castNU r0), (castNU r1)) in
6 let (v , _) = mux (g, v1 , v2) in
7 castP (castU v)
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It is important to note that, if casts are used correctly, then PMTO is preserved. In other words, if
all instances of castU are used on values which are truly uniformly distributed then the type system
ensures that the program is PMTO. These uniformity obligations can be verified manually, or using
external tools [Barthe et al. 2018a].
Using this simple extension we can modify the stackop procedure in Figure 14 by inserting a
single castU on pos ' after line 7, and a castNU on tmp after line 8. This has the effect of casting all
position tags pushed on the OStack to “non-uniform” type, and all position tags popped off the
stack to “uniform” type again. The safety of these casts relies on the functional correctness of the
non-recursive ORAM. As mentioned above, if the nroram faithfully implements a map, then we
can expect to receive a uniformly distributed value after every pop (since every push generates a
fresh random number).
B COMPLETE PMTO PROOF
In this section we give a complete proof of PMTO. First, in Section B.1 we present the final proof
of PMTO in top-down breadth-first organization for major lemmas, and depth-first organization
for sublemmas required to prove major lemmas. In many proofs we abbreviate “suffices to show”
as “STS”. Next, in Section B.3 we show complete definitions for all semantics, type rules, auxiliary
metafunctions, and low-equivalence relations which are used in the proof.
The heart of the type system design is typing for flip values:
Flip-Value
Pr
[
bˆ Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2 [bˆ ⊥ ΨF ,ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ})  Φ]
ΨF ,ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
This invariant dictates that (1) the distribution is uniform, and (2) that it is jointly independent of all
other flip values in the execution context ΨF , and all other secret bit values in the execution context
at strictly lower region ΨB . Joint independence is crucial and strictly stronger than individual
independence; to see this, note that A ⊥ B and A ⊥ C does not imply A ⊥ B,C , however the
converse is true.
The heart of the proof is Type Preservation, and its main sublemma Type Preservation Redex.
The key semantic property of mux operations used in those lemmas is Cond Stability.
B.1 Theorems and Lemmas
The main metatheory result for λobliv is PMTO. The proof follows from major sublemmas.
Theorem B.1 (PMTO).
Probabilistic equality modulo adversary observability for source expressions is preserved by the ground
truth semantics.
If: e1 and e2 are closed source expressions
And: ⊢ e1 : τ and ⊢ e2 : τ
And: obs(e1) = obs(e2)
Then:
(1) nstepD(N ,, e1) and nstepD(N ,, e2) are defined
(2) o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e1)) = o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e2))
Proof.
(1) is by Progress (Ground Truth)
(2) is by the following:
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obs(e1) = obs(e2)
=⇒ N Low-equivalence Completeness (Source Expressions) O
e1 ∼ e2
=⇒ N PMTO (Mixed) O
nstep(N ,, e1) ≈∼ nstep(N ,, e2)
=⇒ N Low-equivalence Soundness O
ôbs(⌈ˆnstep(N ,, e1)⌉ˆ) ≈= ôbs(⌈ˆnstep(N ,, e2)⌉ˆ)
=⇒ N Simulation (Mixed) O
ôbs(nstepI(N ,, e1)) ≈= ôbs(nstepI(N ,, e2))
=⇒ N Simulation (Intensional) O
o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e1)) = o˜bs(nstepD(N ,, e2))
□
B.1.1 PMTO Proof Key Lemmas.
Progress (Ground Truth).
Lemma B.2 (Progress (Ground Truth)).
Progress holds for the ground truth semantics.
If: ⊢ ς
Then: nstepD(N , ς) is total
Proof. Induction on N and Progress (Ground Truth) Single □
Lemma B.3 (Progress (Ground Truth) Single).
Progress holds for the ground truth semantics on a single step.
If: Σ ⊢ σ , e
Then either:
(1) e = v for v a value
(2) e = E[e ′] and e ′ a redex
In both cases stepD(N ,σ , e) is total
Proof. Induction on e and inversion on assumed well-typing □
Low-equivalence Completeness.
Lemma B.4 (Low-eqivalence Completeness (Source Expressions)).
Source expressions which are equal modulo adversary observation are low-equivalent.
If: e1 and e2 are source expressions
And: obs(e1) = obs(e2)
Then: ⌊e1⌋ ∼ ⌊e2⌋
Proof. Induction on e1 and e2, and discrimination on assumed obs(e1) = obs(e2) □
PMTO (Mixed).
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Lemma B.5 (PMTO (Mixed)).
Probabilistic low-equivalence for source expressions is preserved by the mixed semantics.
If: e1 and e2 are closed source expressions
And: ⊢ e1 : τ and ⊢ e2 : τ
And: e1 ∼ e2
Then:
(1) nstep(N ,, e1) and nstep(N ,, e2) are defined
(2) nstep(N ,, e1) ≈∼ nstep(N ,, e2)
Proof.
(1) is by Progress (Mixed)
(2) is by induction on N
- Case N = 0:
STS: return(e1) ≈∼ return(e2)
By Return Equivalence
- Case N = N + 1:
nstep(N ,, e1) ≈∼ nstep(N ,, e2) (IH) (by inductive hypothesis)
STS:
do t ·ς ← nstep(N ,, e1)
ς ′ ← step(N + 1, ς)
return(t ·ς , ς ′)
≈∼
do t ·ς ← nstep(N ,, e1)
ς ′ ← step(N + 1, ς)
return(t ·ς , ς ′)
By Bind Equivalence, Return Equivalence and (IH), STS:
- t1·ς1 ∼ t2·ς2 =⇒
[
step(N + 1, ς
1
)
 Φ1] ≈∼ [step(N + 1, ς2)  Φ2]
where Φ1 ≜ [nstep(N ,, e1) Û= t1·ς1] and Φ2 ≜ [nstep(N ,, e2) Û= t2·ς2]
By Type Preservation:
- There exists Σ1, Σ2, Ψ1 and Ψ2
S.t. Φ1, Σ1 ⊢ ς1 ; Ψ1 and Φ2, Σ2 ⊢ ς2 ; Ψ2
Conclusion is by PMTO (Mixed) Single applied to premise and the above well-typing
□
Lemma B.6 (PMTO (Mixed) Single).
Probabilistic low-equivalence for source expressions is preserved by the mixed semantics on a single
step.
If: Φ1, Σ1 ⊢ ς1 ; Ψ1 and Φ2, Σ2 ⊢ ς2 ; Ψ2
And: ς
1
∼ ς
2
Then:
[
step(N , ς
1
)
 Φ1] ≈∼ [step(N , ς2)  Φ2]
Proof. By case analysis on ς
1
∼ ς
2
and Progress (Mixed); two cases:
(1) Case ς
1
= σ 1,v1 and ς2 = σ 2,v2 for v1 and v2 values
step(N , ) is the same as return on values
Immediate by Return Equivalence
(2) Case ς
1
= σ 1,E1[e1] and ς2 = σ 2,E2[e2] for e1 and e2 redexes
σ 1 ∼ σ 2
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e1 ∼ e2 (by Contexts Preserve Low Equivalence)[
step(N ,σ 1, e1)
 Φ1] ≈∼ [step(N ,σ 2, e2)  Φ2] (by PMTO (Mixed) Redex)[
step(N ,σ 1,E1[e1])
 Φ1] ≈∼ [step(N ,σ 2,E2[e2])  Φ2] (by Bind Equivalence, Return Equiva-
lence and Contexts Preserve Low Equivalence)
□
Lemma B.7 (PMTO (Mixed) Redex).
Probabilistic low-equivalence for source expressions is preserved by the mixed semantics on a single
step for redex configurations.
If: ς
1
and ς
2
are redex configurations
And: Φ1, Σ1 ⊢ ς1 ; Ψ1 and Φ2, Σ2 ⊢ ς2 ; Ψ2
And: ς
1
∼ ς
2
Then:
[
step(N , ς
1
)
 Φ1] ≈∼ [step(N , ς2)  Φ2]
Proof. By inversion:
σ 1 ∼ σ 2 e1 ∼ e2
σ 1, e1 ∼ σ 2, e2
Case analysis on e1 and e2 and inversion on low-equivalence judgment; all cases but two are
immediate by Return Equivalence because definition of step is a return
(1) Non-immediate case e1 = castP (flipv(bˆ1)) and e2 = castP (flipv(bˆ2)):
By assumed well-typing:
- Pr
[
bˆ1 Û= I
 Φ1] = 1/2
- Pr
[
bˆ2 Û= I
 Φ2] = 1/2
By above facts, Bind Equivalence and because return(bitvP (I)) ̸∼ return(bitvP (F)):[
do b ← bˆ1
return(bitvP (b))
 Φ1] ≈∼ [do b ← bˆ2return(bitvP (b))
 Φ2]
(2) Non-immediate case e1 = if(bitvP (bˆ)){e11}{e12} and e2 = if(bitvP (bˆ)){e21}{e22}:
By assumed well-typing:
- bˆ = return(b)
By assumed low-equivalence judgment:
- e11 ∼ e21 and e12 ∼ e22
By above facts and Monad Laws:[
do b ← bˆ
return(cond(b, e11, e12))
 Φ1] ≈∼ [do b ← bˆreturn(cond(b, e21, e22))
 Φ2]
(3) Non-immediate cases e1 and e2 let-statements or function application
By PMTO (Mixed) Substitution
□
Lemma B.8 (PMTO (Mixed) Substitution).
Low-equivalence is preserved by substitution.
If: v1 ∼ v2
And: e1 ∼ e2
And: x is free in e1 and e2
Then: [v1/x]e1 ∼ [v2/x]e2
Proof. Induction on e1 and e2 and inversion on assumed low equivalence □
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Lemma B.9 (Contexts Preserve Low Eqivalence).
Low-equivalent terms have low-equivalent sub-terms, and contexts respect low-equivalence.
If: E1[e1] ∼ E2[e2]
Then:
(1) e1 ∼ e2
(2) e ′1 ∼ e ′2 =⇒ E1[e1] ∼ E2[e2]
Proof. Induction on E1 and E2 and inversion on assumed low equivalence
□
Lemma B.10 (Progress (Mixed)).
Progress holds for the mixed semantics.
If: Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ; Ψ
Then: nstep(N , ς) is total
Proof. Induction on N and Progress (Mixed) Single □
Lemma B.11 (Progress (Mixed) Single).
Progress holds for the mixed semantics on a single step.
If: Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ ; Ψ
Then either:
(1) e = v for v a value
(2) e = E[e] and e a redex
In both cases step(N ,σ , e) is total.
Proof. Induction on e and inversion on assumed well-typing □
Low-equivalence Soundness.
Lemma B.12 (Low-eqivalence Soundness).
When projected, low-equivalent trace distributions have equal probability distributions modulo adver-
sary observation.
If: tˆ1 ≈∼ tˆ2
Then: ôbs(⌈ˆtˆ1⌉ˆ) ≈= ôbs(⌈ˆtˆ2⌉ˆ)
Proof. Rewrite both sides by:
ôbs(⌈ˆtˆ i ⌉ˆ)
= ôbs(do t ← tˆ i ; ⌈t⌉) N defn. of ⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ O
= do t ← tˆ i ; ôbs(⌈t⌉) N defn. of ôbs and Monad Laws O
By Bind Equivalence and low-equivalence premise, STS:
- t1 ∼ t2 =⇒ ôbs(⌈t1⌉) ≈= ôbs(⌈t2⌉)
By Low-equivalence Soundness Element
□
Lemma B.13 (Low-eqivalence Soundness Element).
When projected, low-equivalent traces have equal probability distributions modulo adversary observa-
tion.
If: t1 ∼ t2
Then: ôbs(⌈t1⌉) ≈= ôbs(⌈t2⌉)
Proof. Induction on traces t1 and t2 and inversion on assumed low-equivalence
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(1) Case t1 = t2 = ϵ
Immediate
(2) Case t1 = t ′1·σ 1, e1 and t2 = t ′2·σ 2, e2
By inversion on assumed low-equivalence:
- t ′1 ∼ t ′2
- σ 1 ∼ σ 2
- e1 ∼ e2
By induction hypothesis:
- ôbs(⌈t ′1⌉) ≈= ôbs(⌈t ′2⌉)
By Low-equivalence Soundness Element Store and Low-equivalence Soundness Element Ex-
pression:
- ôbs(⌈σ 1⌉) ≈= ôbs(⌈σ 2⌉)
- ôbs(⌈e1⌉) ≈= ôbs(⌈e2⌉)
Rewrite both sides by:
ôbs(⌈t ′i ·ς i ⌉)
= do
•
t ← ôbs(⌈t ′i ⌉)•
σ ← ôbs(⌈σ i ⌉)•
e ← ôbs(⌈ei ⌉)
return(•t · •σ , •e)
N defn. of ⌈ ⌉ and ôbs, and Monad Laws O
By iterated Bind Equivalence, Return Equivalence and three previously established facts
□
Lemma B.14 (Low-eqivalence Soundness Element Store).
When projected, low-equivalent stores have equal probability distributions modulo adversary observa-
tion.
If: σ 1 ∼ σ 2
Then: ôbs(⌈σ 1⌉) ≈= ôbs(⌈σ 2⌉)
Proof. Induction on σ 1 and σ 2, inversion on assumed low-equivalence, Monad Laws, Return
Equivalence and Bind Equivalence. □
Lemma B.15 (Low-eqivalence Soundness Element Expression).
When projected, low-equivalent expressions have equal probability distributions modulo adversary
observation.
If: e1 ∼ e2
Then: ôbs(⌈e1⌉) ≈= ôbs(⌈e2⌉)
Proof. Induction on e1 and e2, inversion on assumed low-equivalence, Monad Laws, Return
Equivalence and Bind Equivalence. □
Simulation (Mixed).
Lemma B.16 (Simulation (Mixed)).
When projected, the mixed semantics simulates the intensional standard semantics on source expres-
sions.
If: e is a source expression
Then: ⌈ˆnstep(N ,, e)⌉ˆ = nstepI(N ,, e)
Proof. Induction on N
(1) Case N = 0:
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⌈e⌉ = e (by Simulation (Mixed) Zero)
(2) Case N = N + 1:
⌈ˆnstep(N ,, e)⌉ˆ = nstepI(N ,, e) (IH) (by inductive hypothesis)
By equational reasoning:
⌈ˆnstep(N + 1,, e)⌉ˆ
= N defn. of nstep and ⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ, Monad Laws and Monad Commutativity O
do t ·ς ← nstep(N ,, e)
t ← ⌈t⌉
ς ← ⌈ς⌉
ς ′ ← step(N + 1, ς)
ς ′ ← ⌈ς ′⌉
return(t ·ς ·ς ′)
= N Simulation (Mixed) Single, Monad Laws and Monad Idempotence (Intensional Only) O
do t ·ς ← nstep(N ,, e)
t ← ⌈t⌉
ς ← ⌈ς⌉
ς ′ ← stepI(N + 1, ς)
return(t ·ς ·ς ′)
= N (IH), Monad Laws and defn. of ⌈ ⌉ O
do t ·ς ← nstepI(N ,, e)
ς ′ ← stepI(N + 1, ς)
return(t ·ς ·ς ′)
= N defn. of nstepI O
nstepI(N ,, e)
□
Lemma B.17 (Simulation (Mixed) Zero).
Projection on source expressions is the identity.
If: e is a source expression
Then: ⌈e⌉ = e
Proof. Induction on e
□
Lemma B.18 (Simulation (Mixed) Single).
When projected, the mixed semantics simulates the intensional standard semantics on source expressions
and on a single step.
⌈ˆstep(N ,σ , e)⌉ˆ = ŝtepI(N , ⌈σ , e⌉)
Proof. Induction on e; first case is shown as representative trivial case; subsequent cases are
non-trivial
- Case e = bℓ :
1:40 David Darais, Ian Sweet, Chang Liu, and Michael Hicks
⌈ˆstep(N ,σ ,bℓ)⌉ˆ
= N defn. of step O
⌈ˆreturn(σ , bitvℓ(return(b)))⌉ˆ
= N defn. of ⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ, stepI and Monad Laws O
do σ ← ⌈σ ⌉
e ← ⌈bℓ⌉
stepI(σ , e)
= N defn. of ⌈ ⌉, ŝtepI and Monad Laws O
ŝtepI(N , ⌈σ ,bℓ⌉)
- Case e = flipρ ():
⌈ˆstep(N ,σ , flipρ ())⌉ˆ
= N defn. of step O
⌈ˆreturn(σ , flipvℓ(bit(N )))⌉ˆ
= N defn. of ⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ, stepI and Monad Laws O
do b ← bit(N ) ; return(σ , flipv(b))
= N defn. of ⌈ ⌉, ŝtepI and Monad Laws O
ŝtepI(N , ⌈σ , flipρ ()⌉)
- Case e = castP (flipv(bˆ)):
⌈ˆstep(N ,σ , castP (flipv(bˆ)))⌉ˆ
= N defn. of step O
⌈ˆdo b ← bˆ ; return(σ , bitvP (return(b)))⌉ˆ
= N defn. of ⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ, stepI and Monad Laws O
do b ← bˆ ; return(σ , bitvP (b))
= N defn. of ⌈ ⌉, ŝtepI and Monad Laws O
ŝtepI(N , ⌈σ , castP (flipv(bˆ))⌉)
- All other cases are analogous to above cases.
□
Simulation (Intensional).
Lemma B.19 (Simulation (Intensional)).
The intensional standard semantics simulates the ground truth semantics on source expressions.
Pr
[
nstepD(N ,, e) Û= ς
]
= Pr
[
nstepI(N ,, e) Û= ς
]
Proof. Induction onN and by Bind Probability, Return Probability and Simulation (Intensional) □
Lemma B.20 (Simulation (Intensional) Single).
The intensional standard semantics simulates the ground truth semantics on source expressions, and
on a single step.
Pr
[
stepD(N ,σ , e) Û= ς
]
= Pr
[
stepI(N ,σ , e) Û= ς
]
Proof. Induction on e and by Bind Probability, Return Probability and bitI(N +1) ⊥ nstepI(N , ς),
which is true by height(nstep(N , ς)) ≤ N and bitI(N + 1) ⊥ xˆ when height(xˆ) ≤ N □
B.2 Type Preservation
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Lemma B.21 (Type Preservation).
Well-typing is preserved by the mixed semantics w.r.t. new trace history.
If: e is a closed source expression
And: ⊢ e : τ
And: t ·ς ∈ support(nstep(N ,, e))
Let: Φ ≜ [nstep(N ,, e) Û= t ·ς]
Then: there exists Σ and Ψ
S.t.: Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ
Proof. By Type Preservation (Strong) which has a stronger conclusion (and therefore induction
hypothesis)
□
Lemma B.22 (Type Preservation (Strong)).
Well-typing is preserved by the mixed semantics w.r.t. new trace history.
If: e is a closed source expression
And: ⊢ e : τ
And: t ·ς ∈ support(nstep(N ,, e))
Let: Φ ≜ [nstep(N ,, e) Û= t ·ς]
Then: there exists Σ and Ψ
S.t.: Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ
And: ∀bˆ ∈ Ψ. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
Proof. Induction on N
(1) Case N = 0:
Φ = [nstep(0,, e) Û= return(, e)] = [true]
Σ = 
Ψ = 
,, ⊢ , e : τ , (by Source Expression Mixed Typing)
(2) Case N = N + 1:
By induction hypothesis (IH):
- Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ ς ′ : τ ,Ψ′ for some Σ′, Ψ′
and where Φ′ ≜ [nstep(N ,, e) Û= t ′·ς ′]
and where t = t ′·ς ′
- ∀bˆ ∈ Ψ′. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
By Type Preservation Single and second fact due to (IH):
- Φ′′, Σ′′ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ′′ for some Σ′′, Ψ′′
and where Φ′′ ≜ [Φ′, step(N , ς ′) Û= ς]
- ∀bˆ ∈ Ψ′′. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1 + 1}
Construct Σ ≜ Σ′′ and Ψ ≜ Ψ′′; by previous typing and bit independence, and Φ′′ = Φ (b.c.
t = t ′·ς ′)
□
Lemma B.23 (Source Expression Mixed Typing).
Well-typed source expressions are well-typed in the mixed type system.
If: e is a source expression
And: ⊢ e : τ (via source expression typing)
Then: ⊢ e : τ (via mixed evaluation typing)
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Proof. Induction on e and inversion on assumed well-typing □
Lemma B.24 (Type Preservation Single).
Well-typing is preserved by the mixed semantics w.r.t. new trace history on a single step.
If: Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ
And: ∀bˆ ∈ Ψ. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N }
And: ς ′ ∈ support(stepI(N , ς))
Let: Φ′ ≜ [Φ, stepI(N , ς) Û= ς ′]
Then: there exists Σ′ and Ψ′
S.t.: Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ ς ′ : τ ,Ψ′
And: ∀bˆ ∈ Ψ′. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
Proof. By Progress (Mixed) and definition of stepI ; two cases:
(1) ς = σ ,v
ς ′ = ς , Φ′ = Φ , Σ′ = Σ and Ψ′ = Ψ
Immediate
(2) ς = σ ,E[e]
ς ′ = σ ′,E[e ′] for σ ′, e ′ ∈ support(stepI(N ,σ , e))
By Contexts Preserve Typing:
- There exists τ ′ , Ψc and Ψ′
S.t.: Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ ′ ; Ψ′
And: Ψc ⊎ Ψ′ = Ψ
By Type Preservation Redex:
- There exists Σ′ and Ψ′′
S.t.: Σ′ ⊇ Σ
And: Ψc ,Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ σ ′, e ′ : τ ′ ; Ψ′′
And: ∀ρ, bˆ . Ψc \ ({bˆ},) ⊎ Ψ′,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ =⇒ Ψc \ ({bˆ},) ⊎ Ψ′′,Φ′ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
And: ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψ′′. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
By Weaken Context and Contexts Preserve Typing:
- Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ σ ′,E[e ′] : τ ; Ψc ⊎ Ψ′′
Construct Σ′ ≜ Σ′ and Ψ′ = Ψc ⊎ Ψ′′; by previous typing and bit independence
□
Lemma B.25 (Contexts Preserve Typing).
If: ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ E[e] : τ ; ,Ψ
Then: there exists τ ′,Ψc ,Ψ′ s.t.:
(1) Ψc ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ e : τ ′ ; ,Ψ′ and Ψc ⊎ Ψ′ = Ψ
(2) Ψc ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ e ′ : τ ′ ; ,Ψ′ and Ψc ⊎ Ψ′ = Ψ =⇒ Ψc ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ E[e ′] : τ ; ,Ψ
Proof. Induction on E and inversion on Ψc ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ E[e] : τ ; ,Ψ
□
Type Preservation Redex.
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Lemma B.26 (Type Preservation Redex).
If: e a redex
And: Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ ; Ψ
And: ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψ. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N }
And: ς ∈ support(stepI(N ,σ , e))
Let: Φ′ ≜ [Φ, stepI(N ,σ , e) Û= ς]
Then: there exists Σ′ and Ψ′
S.t.: Σ′ ⊇ Σ
And: Ψc ,Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ ς : τ ; Ψ′
And: ∀ρ, bˆ . Ψc \ ({bˆ},) ⊎ Ψ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ =⇒ Ψc \ ({bˆ},) ⊎ Ψ′,Φ′ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
And: ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψ′. bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
Proof. By inversion:
Ψc ⊎ Ψe ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ e : τ ; ,Ψe
Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ ; Ψσ ⊎ Ψe
Case analysis on e:
(1) e = flipρ ()
By inversion:
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ flipρ () : flipρ ; ⊘,,
τ = flipρ
Ψe = ,
ς = σ , flipv(bit(N ))
Φ′ = [Φ, stepI(N ,σ , flipρ () Û= σ , flipv(bit(N ))] = Φ
Ψ′e ≜ {bit(N )},
Construct Σ′ ≜ Σ ⊇ Σ
Construct Ψ′ ≜ Ψσ ⊎ ({bit(N )},) = Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e
To show:
(a) Ψc ⊎ {bit(N )},Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
(b) Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ ⊢ flipv(bit(N )) : flipρ ; 
(c) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′.
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
=⇒
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ ({bit(N )},),Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
(d) ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ ({bit(N )},). bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
(a) is by Weaken Store and Type Preservation: Flip applied to Ψc
(b-c) are by Type Preservation: Flip applied to Ψc ⊎ Ψσ
(d) is by assumed bit independence and Bit Independence
(2) e = castP (flipv(bˆ))
By inversion:
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ ⊢ flipv(bˆ) : flipρ ; {bˆ},
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ castP (flipv(bˆ)) : bit⊥P ; ⊘, {bˆ},
τ = bit⊥P
Ψe = {bˆ},
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ς = σ , bitvP (return(b)) for b ∈ {O, I}
Φ′ = [Φ, stepI(N ,σ , castP (flipv(bˆ))) Û= σ , bitvP (return(b))] = [Φ, bˆ Û= b]
Ψ′e ≜ 
Construct Σ′ ≜ Σ ⊇ Σ
Construct Ψ′ ≜ Ψσ = Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e
To show:
(a) Ψc , [Φ, bˆ Û= b], Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
(b) Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , [Φ, bˆ Û= b], Σ ⊢ bitvP (return(b)) : bit⊥P ; 
(c) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′.
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ ({bˆ},),Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
=⇒
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ , [Φ, bˆ Û= b], Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
(d) ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ . bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
(a) is by Weaken Store and Type Preservation: CastP applied to Ψc
(b-c) are by Type Preservation: CastP applied to Ψc ⊎ Ψσ
(d) is by assumption
(3) e = castS (flipv(bˆ))
By inversion:
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ ⊢ flipv(bˆ) : flipρ ; , {ρ 7→ bˆ}
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ castS (flipv(bˆ)) : bitρS ; ⊘,, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}
τ = bit
ρ
S
Ψe = , {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}
ς = σ , bitvS (bˆ)
Φ′ = [Φ, stepI(N ,σ , castS (flipv(bˆ))) Û= σ , bitvS (bˆ)] = Φ
Ψ′e ≜ , {ρ 7→ {bˆ}} = Ψe
Σ ≜ Σ ⊇ Σ
Ψ′ ≜ Ψσ ⊎ Ψe = Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e
To show:
(a) Ψc ⊎ (, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}),Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
(b) Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bitvS (bˆ) : bitρS ; , {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}
(c) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′.
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ (, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}),Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
=⇒
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ (, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}),Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
(d) ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ (, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}). bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
(a) is by assumption
(b) is immediate
(c) is immediate
(d) is by assumption
(4) e = mux(bitvS (bˆ1), bitvS (bˆ2), bitvS (bˆ3))
By inversion:
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Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ ⊢ bitvS (bˆ1) : bitρ1S ; , {ρ1 7→{bˆ1 }}
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ ⊢ bitvS (bˆ2) : bitρ2S ; , {ρ2 7→{bˆ2 }} Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ ⊢ bitvS (bˆ3) : bit
ρ3
S ; , {ρ3 7→{bˆ3 }}
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ,  ⊢ mux(bitvS (bˆ1), bitvS (bˆ2), bitvS (bˆ3)) : bitρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3S × bit
ρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3
S ; ⊘, , {ρi 7→ {bˆi }}
τ = bit
ρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3
S × bitρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3S
Ψe = , {ρi 7→ {bˆi }}
ς = σ , ⟨bitvS (cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), bitvS (cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩
Φ′ = [Φ, stepI (N , σ , mux(bitvS (bˆ1), bitvS (bˆ2), bitvS (bˆ3))) Û= σ , ⟨bitvS (cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), bitvS (cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩] = Φ
Ψ′e = , {ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 7→ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3),cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)}}
Σ ≜ Σ ⊇ Σ
Ψ′ ≜ Ψσ ⊎ (, {ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 7→ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3),cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)}}) = Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e
To show:
(a) Ψc ⊎ Ψ′e ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
(b) Ψc⊎Ψσ ,Φ, Σ ⊢ ⟨bitvS (cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), bitvS (cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩ : bitρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3S ×bitρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3S ; Ψ′e
(c) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′.
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψe ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
=⇒
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
(d) ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e . {bˆ ⊥ bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
(a) is by assumption
(b) is immediate
(c) is by Type Preservation: Mux BitS applied to Ψc ⊎ Ψσ
(d) is by assumption and Cond Independence
(5) e = mux(bitvS (bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2), flipv(bˆ3))
By inversion:
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ ⊢ bitvS (bˆ1) : bitρ1S ; , {ρ1 7→{bˆ1 }}
ρ1 ⊏ ρ2 ρ1 ⊏ ρ3
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ ⊢ bˆ2 : flipρ2
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ ⊢ flipv(bˆ2) : flipρ2 ; {bˆ2 }, 
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ ⊢ bˆ3 : flipρ3
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ ⊢ flipv(bˆ3) : flipρ3 ; {bˆ3 }, 
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ , Φ, Σ,  ⊢ mux(bitvS (bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2), flipv(bˆ3)) : flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3 × flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3 ; ⊘, {bˆ2, bˆ3 }, {ρ1 7→{bˆ1 }}
τ = flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3 × flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3
Ψe = {bˆ2, bˆ3}, {ρ1 7→{bˆ1}}
ς = σ , ⟨flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩
Φ′ = [Φ, stepI (N , σ , mux(bitvS (bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2), flipv(bˆ3))) Û= σ , ⟨flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩] = Φ
Ψ′e = {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3),cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},
Σ ≜ Σ ⊇ Σ
Ψ′ ≜ Ψσ ⊎ ({cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3),cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},) = Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e
To show:
(a) Ψc ⊎ Ψ′e ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
(b) Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ ⊢ ⟨flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩ : flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3 × flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3 ;
Ψ′e
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(c) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′.
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψe ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
=⇒
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
(d) ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′e . {bˆ ⊥ bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
(a) is by Weaken Store and Type Preservation: Flip applied to Ψc
(b-c) are by Type Preservation: Flip applied to Ψc ⊎ Ψσ
(d) is by assumption and Cond Independence
(6) e = xor(bitvS (bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2))
Analogous to mux-flip case
(7) e = let x = v in e
By inversion:
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψe ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ v : τ ′ ; ,Ψv Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψv ,Φ, Σ, [x 7→ τ ′] ⊢ e ′ : τ ; ,Ψ′e
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ let x = v in e ′ : τ ; ⊘,Ψv ⊎ Ψ′e
Ψe = Ψv ⊎ Ψ′e
ς = σ , [v/x]e
Φ′ = [Φ, stepI(N ,σ , let x = v in e ′)) Û= σ , [v/x]e] = Φ
By Type Preservation: Substitution:
- There exists Ψ′v
S.t.: Ψ′v ⊆ Ψv
And: Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ [v/x]e : τ2 ; Γ′,Ψ′v ⊎ Ψ′e
Σ ≜ Σ ⊇ Σ
Ψ′ ≜ Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′v ⊎ Ψ′e
To show:
(a) Ψc ⊎ Ψ′v ⊎ Ψ′e ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
(b) Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ [v/x]e : τ2 ; Γ′,Ψ′v ⊎ Ψ′e
(c) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′.
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψv ⊎ Ψ′e ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
=⇒
Ψc \ ({bˆ ′},) ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′v ⊎ Ψ′e ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
(d) ∀bˆ ∈ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ⊎ Ψ′v ⊎ Ψ′e . {bˆ ⊥ bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N + 1}
(a) is by Weaken Store and Weaken Flip
(b) is by Type Preservation: Substitution
(c) is by Weaken Flip
(d) is by assumed bit independence
(8) e = let x ,y = v in e and e = (funy (x : τ ). e)(v)
Analogous to single-variable let-binding case
□
Lemma B.27 (Type Preservation: Flip).
If: ∀bˆ ∈ ΨF ,ΨB . bˆ ⊥ {bit(N ′) | N ′ ≥ N }
Then: ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′. ΨF \ {bˆ},ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′ =⇒ Ψ \ {bˆ} ⊎ {bit(N )},ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
Proof. Assume some ρ ′, bˆ ′ where ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
By inversion:
- Pr
[
bˆ ′ Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2
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-
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})
 Φ]
STS:
-
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ bit(N ),ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})
 Φ]
By assumption of bit independence and second inversion fact
□
Lemma B.28 (Type Preservation: CastP).
If: ΨF ,ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Then:
(1) Ψc , [Φ, bˆ Û= b] ⊢ return(b) : bit⊥P ; 
(2) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′. ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {bˆ},ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′ =⇒ ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB , [Φ, bˆ Û= b] ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
Proof. (1) Immediate by constructing type derivation
(2) Assume some ρ ′ and bˆ ′ where ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {bˆ},ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
By inversion:
- Pr
[
bˆ ′ Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2 (H1)
-
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ bˆ,ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})
 Φ] (H2)
STS:
(a) Pr
[
bˆ ′ Û= I
 Φ, bˆ Û= b] = 1/2
(b)
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})
 Φ, bˆ Û= b]
(a) is by Decomposition applied (H2) to establish
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ bˆ
 Φ] , which is then applied to (H1)
(b) is by Decomposition applied to (H2), moving bˆ from the RHS of independence into the
condition
□
Lemma B.29 (Type Preservation: Mux BitS).
If: ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB ∪ {ρ1 7→{bˆ1}, ρ2 7→{bˆ2}, ρ3 7→{bˆ3}},Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
Then: ΨF \ {bˆ ′},ΨB ∪ {ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 7→{cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)}},Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
Proof. By inversion:
- Pr
[
bˆ ′ Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2
-
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ bˆ,ΨF \ {bˆ ′}, (ΨB ∪ {ρ1 7→{bˆ1}, ρ2 7→{bˆ2}, ρ3 7→{bˆ3}})({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})
 Φ] (H)
STS:
-
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ bit(N ),ΨF \ {bˆ ′}, (ΨB ∪ {ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 7→{cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)}})({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})  Φ]
(1) Case ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 ̸⊏ ρ ′:
(ΨB ∪ {ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 7→{cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)}})({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}) = ΨB
By (H) and Decomposition
(2) Case ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 ⊏ ρ ′:
(ΨB ∪ {ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3 7→{cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)}})({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}) = ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}) ∪
{cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)}
(ΨB ∪ {ρ1 7→{bˆ1}, ρ2 7→{bˆ2}, ρ3 7→{bˆ3}})({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}) = ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}) ∪ {bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3}
By (H) and Cond Independence
□
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Lemma B.30 (Type Preservation: Flip).
If: ΨF ⊎ {bˆ3},ΨB ⊎ {ρ1 7→ {bˆ1}},Φ ⊢ bˆ2 : flipρ2
And: ΨF ⊎ {bˆ2},ΨB ⊎ {ρ1 7→ {bˆ1}},Φ ⊢ bˆ3 : flipρ3
And: ρ1 ⊏ ρ2 and ρ1 ⊏ ρ3
Then:
(1) ΨF ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ,Φ ⊢cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3) : flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3
(2) ΨF ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)},ΨB ,Φ ⊢cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2) : flipρ1⊔ρ2⊔ρ3
(3) ∀ρ ′, bˆ ′.
ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {bˆ2, bˆ3},ΨB ∪ {ρ1 7→ {bˆ1}},Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
=⇒
ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3),cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
Proof. By inversion:
- Pr
[
bˆ2 Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2 (H11)
-
[
bˆ2 ⊥ ΨF ⊎ {bˆ3}, (ΨB ⊎ {ρ1 7→ {bˆ1}})({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ2})
 Φ] (H12)
- Pr
[
bˆ3 Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2 (H21)
-
[
bˆ3 ⊥ ΨF ⊎ {bˆ2}, (ΨB ⊎ {ρ1 7→ {bˆ1}})({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ3})
 Φ] (H22)
By ρ1 ⊏ ρ2 and ρ1 ⊏ ρ3:
-
[
bˆ2 ⊥ ΨF ⊎ {bˆ3},ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ2}), bˆ1
 Φ] (H13)
-
[
bˆ3 ⊥ ΨF ⊎ {bˆ2},ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ2}), bˆ1
 Φ] (H23)
(1) STS:
(a) Pr
[cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3) Û= I] = 1/2 (i)
(b)
[cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3) ⊥ ΨF ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3})  Φ] (ii)
(i) is by Cond Stability applied to (H13) and Decomposition (to achieve
[
bˆ2 ⊥ bˆ1
 Φ]), (H23)
and Decomposition (to achieve
[
bˆ3 ⊥ bˆ1
 Φ] ), (H11) and (H21)
(ii) is by:
Pr
[cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)  ΨF ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3}),Φ]
= N Total Probability O
Pr
[
bˆ2
 bˆ1 Û= I,ΨF ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3}),Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= I]
+
Pr
[
bˆ3
 bˆ1 Û= I,ΨF ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3}),Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= I]
= N (H13), (H23) and Decomposition O
Pr
[
bˆ2
 bˆ1 Û= I,Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= I] + Pr [bˆ3  bˆ1 Û= I,Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= I]
= N Total Probability O
Pr
[cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)  Φ]
(2) STS:
(a) Pr
[cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2) Û= I] = 1/2
(b)
[cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2) ⊥ ΨF ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)},ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3})  Φ]
Analogous to previous cases
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(3) Assume ρ ′ and bˆ ′ where ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {bˆ2, bˆ3},ΨB ∪ {ρ1 7→ {bˆ1}},Φ ⊢ bˆ ′ : flipρ′
By inversion:
- Pr
[
bˆ ′ Û= I
]
= 1/2
-
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {bˆ2, bˆ3}, (ΨB ∪ {ρ1 7→ {bˆ1}})({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})
 Φ] (i)
STS:
-
[
bˆ ′ ⊥ ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3),cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′})  Φ]
Pr
[
bˆ ′
 ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3),cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2)},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}),Φ]
= N Total Probability O
Pr
[
bˆ ′
 bˆ1 Û= I,ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {bˆ2, bˆ3},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}),Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= I]
+
Pr
[
bˆ ′
 bˆ1 Û= O,ΨF \ {bˆ ′} ⊎ {bˆ2, bˆ3},ΨB ({ρ ′′ | ρ ′′ ⊏ ρ ′}),Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= O]
= N (i), (H13) and (H23) O
Pr
[
bˆ ′
 bˆ1 Û= I,Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= I] + Pr [bˆ ′  bˆ1 Û= O,Φ] Pr [bˆ1 Û= O]
= N Total Probability O
Pr
[
bˆ ′
 Φ]
□
Lemma B.31 (Type Preservation: Substitution).
If: K(τ1) = A
And: Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, ⊢ v : τ1,Ψ1
And: Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •τ ′1],Ψ2
Then: there exists Ψ′1
S.t.: Ψ′1 ⊆ Ψ1
And: Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ [v/x]e : τ2 ; Γ′,Ψ′1 ⊎ Ψ2
Proof.
Case analysis on •τ ′1:
(1) •τ ′1 = τ1
Ψ′1 ≜ 
By  ⊆ Ψ1, Affine Substitution Unused and Weaken Expression applied to ?? and Weaken Flip
(2) •τ ′1 = •
Ψ′1 ≜ Ψ1
By Ψ1 ⊆ Ψ1 and Affine Substitution Used
□
Lemma B.32 (Affine Substitution Used).
If: K(τ1) = A
And: Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, ⊢ v : τ1 ; ,Ψ1
And: Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ2
Then: Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ [v/x]e : τ2 ; Γ′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2
Proof.
Induction on e , Context Monotonicity and Affine Substitution Unused
Representative inductive case:
e = ⟨e1, e2⟩
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Must be one of the following (by Context Monotonicity):
(1)
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ22,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e21 : τ21 ; Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1],Ψ21
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ21,Φ, Σ, Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e22 : τ22 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ22
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ ⟨e21, e22⟩ : τ21 × τ22 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ21 ⊎ Ψ22
Goal: Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ [v/x]⟨e21, e22⟩ : τ21 × τ22 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ21 ⊎ Ψ22[v/x]⟨e21, e22⟩ = ⟨e21, [v/x]e22⟩ (by Affine Substitution Unused)
STS:
(a) Ψc ⊎ Ψ22,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e21 : τ21 ; Γ′′,Ψ21 (by ??)
(b) Ψc ⊎ Ψ21,Φ, Σ, Γ′′ ⊢ [v/x]e22 : τ ; Γ′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ22 (by Inductive Hypothesis)
(2)
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ22,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e21 : τ21 ; Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ21
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ21,Φ, Σ, Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ •] ⊢ e22 : τ22 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ22
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ ⟨e21, e22⟩ : τ21 × τ22 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ21 ⊎ Ψ22
Analogous to (1) where [v/x]⟨e21, e22⟩ = ⟨[v/x]e21, e22⟩
□
Lemma B.33 (Affine Substitution Unused).
If: Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ •] ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ •],Ψ
Or: K(τ1) = A and Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1],Ψ
Then: [v/x]e = e
Proof.
Induction on e and Context Monotonicity
□
Lemma B.34 (Context Monotonicity).
If: Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ′,Ψ
Then: Γ(x) ⊑ Γ′(x)
Proof.
Induction on e and partial order properties
□
Weakening.
Lemma B.35 (Weaken Context).
If: Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ ,Ψ
And: Ψc ,Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ σ ′, e ′ : τ ,Ψ′
And: Σ′ ⊇ Σ
And: ∀bˆ, ρ. Ψ ⊎ Ψc ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : bitρS =⇒ Ψ′ ⊎ Ψc ,Φ′ ⊢ bˆ : bitρS
And: ∀bˆ, ρ. Ψ/Ψc ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ =⇒ Ψ′/Ψc ,Φ′ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
And: Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ,E[e] : τ ′,Ψc ⊎ Ψ
Then: Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ σ ′,E[e ′] : τ ′,Ψc ⊎ Ψ′
Proof.
Induction on E and Weaken Expression
□
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Lemma B.36 (Weaken Store).
If: Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψ
And: Σ′ ⊇ Σ
And: ∀bˆ, ρ. Ψc/Ψ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ =⇒ Ψ′c/Ψ,Φ′ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Then: Ψ′c ,Φ′, Σ′ ⊢ σ ; Ψ
Proof.
Induction on σ , Weaken Expression and Σ(ι) = τ =⇒ Σ′(ι) = τ
□
Lemma B.37 (Weaken Expression).
If: Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′,Ψ
And: Σ′ ⊇ Σ
And: ∀bˆ, ρ. Ψc/Ψ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ =⇒ Ψ′c/Ψ,Φ′ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ (H)
Then: Ψ′c ,Φ′, Σ′, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′,Ψ
Induction on e , Weaken Bit Value and application of (H) on flip values
Lemma B.38 (Weaken Bit Value).
If: Ψc ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : bitvρℓ
Then: Ψ′c ,Φ′ ⊢ bˆ : bitρℓ
Proof.
Immediate by inversion and re-construction of the type derivation
□
Lemma B.39 (Weaken Flip).
If: ΨFc ,Ψ
B
c ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipvρ
And: ΨF ′c ,ΨB ′c ⊆ ΨFc ,ΨBc
Then: ΨF ′c ,ΨBc ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipvρ
Proof.
By inversion:
Pr
[
bˆ Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2 [bˆ ⊥ ΨFc ,ΨBc ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ})  Φ] (H)
ΨFc ,Ψ
B
c ,Φ, Σ ⊢ bˆ : flipvρ
STS:
[
bˆ ⊥ ΨF ′c ,ΨB ′c ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ})
 Φ]
By (H) and ?? (Decomposition) with ΨF ′c ⊆ ΨFc and ΨB ′c ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ}) ⊆ ΨBc ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ})
□
B.2.1 Intensional Distribution Lemmas. All of the following lemmas are proved for intensional
distributions xˆ ∈ I(A), however except for ??, each of the properties are also true of denotational
distributions x˜ ∈ D(A) (although the proof given only applies to intensional distributions). Recall
that trees are considered equal = when they are syntactically equal modulo height extension, i.e.,
xˆ = ‹xˆxˆ›.
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Lemma B.40 (Proper Distribution).
(1)
∑
x ∈support(xˆ )
Pr [xˆ Û= x] = 1
(2) If: Pr [yˆ Û= y] > 0
Then: Pr [xˆ Û= x | yˆ Û= y] is defined
And:
∑
x ∈support(xˆ )
Pr [xˆ Û= x | yˆ Û= y] = 1
Proof. Induction on the tree-structure of xˆ □
Lemma B.41 (Return Probability).
(1) Pr [returnI(x) Û= x] = 1
(2) Pr [returnI(x) Û= y] = 0 when x , y
Proof. Immediate by definition of return and Pr
□
Lemma B.42 (Bind Probability).
Pr [do x ← xˆ ; f (x) Û= y] = ∑
x
Pr [f (x) Û= y | xˆ Û= x] Pr [xˆ Û= x]
Proof. Induction on the tree-structure of xˆ
□
Lemma B.43 (Monad Laws).
(do x ← returnI(y) ; f (x)) = f (y) (left-unit)
(do x ← xˆ ; return(x)) = xˆ (right-unit)
(do y ← (do x ← xˆ ; f (x)) ; д(y)) = (do x ← xˆ ; y ← f (x) ; д(y)) (associativity)
Proof. (1) (left-unit)
immediate from definitions
(2) (right-unit)
Case analysis on xˆ
- Case xˆ = x :
x = x ; immediate
- Case xˆ = ‹xˆ1xˆ2›:
‹π1(‹xˆ1xˆ2›)π2(‹xˆ1xˆ2›)› = ‹xˆ1xˆ2›; immediate
(3) (associativity)
Case analysis on xˆ :
- Case xˆ = x :
(do y ← f (x) ; д(y)) = (do y ← f (x) ; д(y)); immediate
- Case xˆ = ‹xˆ1xˆ2›:
‹π1(д(π1(f (xˆ1))))π2(д(π2(f (xˆ2))))› = ‹π1(д(π1(f (xˆ1))))π2(д(π2(f (xˆ2))))›; immediate
□
Lemma B.44 (Monad Commutativity).
(do x ← xˆ ; y ← yˆ ; f (x ,y)) = (do y ← yˆ ; x ← xˆ ; f (x ,y))
Proof. Case analysis on xˆ :
- Case xˆ = x :
(do y ← yˆ ; f (x ,y)) = (do y ← yˆ ; f (x ,y)); immediate
- Case xˆ = ‹xˆ1xˆ2›:
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‹π1(do y ← yˆ ; f (xˆ1,y))π2(do y ← yˆ ; f (xˆ2,y))›
=
do y ← yˆ ; ‹π1(f (xˆ1,y))π2(f (xˆ2,y))›
Finally by case analysis on yˆ
□
Lemma B.45 (Monad Idempotence (Intensional Only)).
The intensional distribution monad I is idempotent.
NOTE: this is in contrast with the denotational distribution monad D which is not idempotent.
(do x1 ← xˆ ; x2 ← xˆ ; f (x1,x2)) = (do x ← xˆ ; f (x ,x))
Proof. Case analysis on xˆ (analogous to monad laws and commutativity proofs)
□
Lemma B.46 (Bit Independence).
A particular random bit is independent of all other random bits.
bit(N ) ⊥ bit(N ′) for N , N ′
Proof. Induction on N and N ′
□
Lemma B.47 (Cond Independence).
A conditional is independent when its inputs are jointly indpendent.
xˆ ⊥ bˆ, yˆ, zˆ =⇒ xˆ ⊥ cond(bˆ, yˆ, zˆ)
Proof. By ?? on bˆ and unfolding definition of bˆ
□
Lemma B.48 (Cond Stability).
A conditional is stable when the guard is independent of branches, and branches have equal distributions.
If: bˆ ⊥ xˆ1
And: bˆ ⊥ xˆ2
And: Pr [xˆ1 Û= x] = Pr [xˆ2 Û= x]
Then:
(1) Pr
[
cond(bˆ, xˆ1, xˆ2) Û= x
]
= Pr [xˆ1 Û= x] = Pr [xˆ2 Û= x]
(2) bˆ ⊥ cond(bˆ, xˆ1, xˆ2)
Proof. (1) Pr
[
cond(bˆ, xˆ1, xˆ2) Û= x
 bˆ Û= b]
= N Total Probability O
Pr
[
xˆ1 Û= x
 bˆ Û= I] Pr [bˆ Û= I] + Pr [xˆ2 Û= x  bˆ Û= O] Pr [bˆ Û= O]
= N bˆ ⊥ xˆi O
Pr [xˆ1 Û= x] Pr
[
bˆ Û= I
]
+ Pr [xˆ2 Û= x] Pr
[
bˆ Û= O
]
= N Pr [xˆ1 Û= x] = Pr [xˆ2 Û= x] O
Pr [xˆ1 Û= x] (Pr
[
bˆ Û= I
]
+ Pr
[
bˆ Û= O
]
)
= N Proper Distribution O
Pr [xˆ1 Û= x]
= Pr [xˆ2 Û= x]
(2) Follows direction from (1)
□
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B.2.2 Probability Facts. All of the following facts are stated using intensional distribution notation
xˆ ∈ I(A), however they are true of any model which supports joint probabilities, including
x˜ ∈ D(A). Proofs are not given because they are standard properties w.r.t. standard definitions.
Fact B.49 (Conditional Decomposition).
Pr [xˆ Û= x | yˆ Û= y] = Pr[xˆ Û=x,yˆ Û=y]Pr[yˆ Û=y]
Fact B.50 (Bayes’ Rule).
Pr
[
xˆ Û= x
 yˆ Û= y, zˆ Û= z] = Pr[yˆ Û=y xˆ Û=x, zˆ Û=z]Pr[xˆ Û=x zˆ Û=z]
Pr
[
yˆ Û=y
zˆ Û=z]
Fact B.51 (Total Probability).
Pr [xˆ Û= x] = ∑
y∈support(yˆ)
Pr [xˆ Û= x | yˆ Û= y] Pr [yˆ Û= y]
Proof. Induction on the tree-structure of xˆ and yˆ □
Fact B.52 (Decomposition).
(1) xˆ ⊥ yˆ, zˆ =⇒ xˆ ⊥ yˆ
(2) xˆ ⊥ yˆ, zˆ =⇒ xˆ ⊥ zˆ
Fact B.53 (Decomposition).
(1) xˆ ⊥ yˆ, zˆ =⇒ [xˆ ⊥ yˆ | zˆ]
(2) xˆ ⊥ yˆ, zˆ =⇒ [xˆ ⊥ zˆ | yˆ]
Fact B.54 (Decomposition).
If: xˆ ⊥ yˆ
And: [xˆ ⊥ yˆ | zˆ]
Then: xˆ ⊥ yˆ, zˆ
Fact B.55 (Independence Eqivalences).
(1)
[
xˆ ⊥ yˆ
 zˆ Û= z]
△⇐⇒ ∀x ,y. Pr
[
xˆ Û= x , yˆ Û= y, zˆ Û= z
]
= Pr
[
xˆ Û= x
 zˆ Û= z] Pr [yˆ Û= y  zˆ Û= z]
⇐⇒ ∀x ,y. Pr
[
xˆ Û= x
 yˆ Û= y, zˆ Û= z] = Pr [xˆ Û= x  zˆ Û= z]
⇐⇒ ∀x ,y. Pr
[
yˆ Û= y
 xˆ Û= x , zˆ Û= z] = Pr [yˆ Û= y  zˆ Û= z]
⇐⇒
[
yˆ ⊥ xˆ
 zˆ Û= z]
Fact B.56 (Return Eqivalence).
If: x1 ∼A x2
Then:
[
returnI(x1)
 yˆ Û= y] ≈∼A [returnI(x2)  zˆ Û= z]
Fact B.57 (Bind Eqivalence).
For: f1, f2 ∈ A→ I(B)
If: xˆ1 ≈∼A xˆ2
And:
∀(x1 ∈ support(xˆ1)), (x2 ∈ support(xˆ2)). x1 ∼A x2 =⇒ [f1(x1) | xˆ1 Û= x1] ≈∼B [f2(x2) | xˆ2 Û= x2]
Then: (xˆ1 ≫= f1) ≈∼B (xˆ2 ≫= f2)
Fact B.58 (Extensional Eqivalence).[
xˆ1
 yˆ Û= y] ≈= [xˆ2  zˆ Û= z]
⇐⇒
∀x ,y. Pr
[
xˆ1 Û= x
 yˆ Û= y] = Pr [xˆ2 Û= x  zˆ Û= z]
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Fact B.59 (Distribution Eqality Injective Function).
If: xˆ1 ≈= xˆ2
And: f is injective
Then: (do x ← xˆ1 ; return(f (x))) ≈= (do x ← xˆ2 ; return(f (x)))
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B.3 Definitions
D(A) ∈ set
x ∈ A x˜ ∈ D(A) ≜
{
f ∈ A→ R
 ∑
x ∈A
f (x) = 1
}
Pr [x˜ Û= x] ≜ x˜(x)
return ∈ D(A) return(x) ≜ λx ′.
{
1 if x = x ′
0 if x , x ′
bind ∈ D(A) × (A→ D(B)) → D(B) bind(x˜ , f ) ≜ λy. ∑
x
f (x)(y)x˜(x)
bit ∈ N→ D(B) bit(N ) ≜ λb . 1/2
Pr
[
x˜ Û= x
 y˜ Û= y] ≜ Pr[x˜ Û=x,y˜ Û=y]Pr[y˜ Û=y][
x˜1
 y˜ Û= y] ≈∼A [x˜2  z˜ Û= z] △⇐⇒ ∀x . ( ∑
x ′ |x ′∼Ax
Pr
[
x˜1 Û= x ′
 y˜ Û= y] ) = ( ∑
x ′ |x ′∼Ax
Pr
[
x˜2 Û= x ′
 z˜ Û= z] )[
x˜ ⊥ y˜
 z˜ Û= z] △⇐⇒ ∀x ,y. Pr [x˜ Û= x , y˜ Û= y  z˜ Û= z] = Pr [x˜ Û= x  z˜ Û= z] Pr [y˜ Û= y  z˜ Û= z]
I(A) ∈ set
x ∈ A
xˆ ∈ I(A)F x | ‹xˆ xˆ›
p ∈ rpathF · | H○ :: p | T○ :: p
[ ] ∈ I(A) × rpath ⇀ A
x[p] ≜ x
‹xˆ1 xˆ2›[ H○ :: p] ≜ xˆ1[p]
‹xˆ1 xˆ2›[ T○ :: p] ≜ xˆ2[p]
support ∈ I(A) → ℘(A)
support(xˆ) ≜ {x | xˆ[p] = x}
π1 ∈ I(A) → I(A)
π1(x) ≜ x
π1(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›) ≜ xˆ1
π2 ∈ I(A) → I(A)
π2(x) ≜ x
π2(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›) ≜ xˆ2
height ∈ I(A)⇀ N
height(x) ≜ 0
height(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›) ≜ 1 +max(height(xˆ1), height(xˆ2))
length ∈ rpath→ B
length(·) ≜ 0
length( :: p) ≜ 1 + length(p)
bit ∈ N→ I(B)
bit(0) ≜ ‹I O›
bit(N + 1) ≜ ‹bit(N ) bit(N )›
return ∈ A→ I(A)
return(x) ≜ x
bind ∈ I(A) × (A→ I(B)) → I(B)
bind(x , f ) ≜ f (x)
bind(‹xˆ1 xˆ2›, f ) ≜ ‹bind(xˆ1,π1◦f ) bind(xˆ2,π2◦f )›
Pr
[
xˆ Û= x
]
≜
{p | length(p)=h, xˆ [p]=x }
2h where h ≜ max(height(xˆ))
Fig. 15. (1) Denotational Distribution Monad; (2) Intensional Distribution Monad
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ℓ ∈ labelF P | S public and secret
(where P ⊏ S) security labels
ρ ∈ R probability region
b ∈ BF O | I bits
x ,y ∈ var variables
v ∈ valF x variable values
| ⟨v,v⟩ tuple values
| funy (x :τ ).e function values
τ ∈ typeF bitρ
ℓ
non-random bit
| flipρ secret uniform bit
| ref(τ ) reference
| τ × τ tuple
| τ → τ function
e ∈ exp
e F v value expressions
| bℓ bit literal
| flipρ () coin flip in region
| castℓ(v) cast flip to bit
| mux(e, e, e) atomic conditional
| xor(e, e) bit xor
| if(e){e}{e} branch conditional
| ref(e) reference creation
| read(e) reference read
| write(e, e) reference write
| ⟨e, e⟩ tuple creation
| let x = e in e variable binding
| let x ,y = e in e tuple elimination
| e(e) fun. application
ι ∈ loc ≈ N
v ∈ val F . . .
| bitvℓ(b)
| flipv(b)
| locv(ι)
σ ∈ store ≜ loc ⇀ val
ς ∈ configF σ , e
t ∈ trace F ϵ | t ·ς
e ∈ exp F . . . same schema
E ∈ cxt F . . . same schema
v ∈ val F . . . extended with. . .
| bitvℓ(bˆ) bit value
| flipv(bˆ) flip value
| locv(ι) location value
σ ∈ store ≜ loc ⇀ val store
ς ∈ configF σ , e configuration
t ∈ trace F ϵ | t ·ς trace
E ∈ cxtF □
| mux(E, e, e) | mux(v,E, e) | mux(v,v,E)
| xor(E, e) | xor(v,E) | if(E, e, e)
| ref(E) | read(E) | write(E, e) | write(v,E)
| ⟨E, e⟩ | ⟨v,E⟩ | E(e) | v(E)
| let x = E in e | let x ,y = E in e
•
e ∈ e•xp F . . . same schema•
E ∈ c•xt F . . . same schema
•
v ∈ v•al F . . . | • extend with •
•
σ ∈ st•ore ≜ loc ⇀ v•al store
•
ς ∈ co•nfigF •σ , •e configuration•
t ∈ tr•ace F ϵ | •t , •ς trace
Fig. 16. (1) Source Syntax; and (2) Runtime syntax: standard, mixed and adversary
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•
τ ∈ t•ypeF τ | • (where τ ⊏ •)
κ ∈ kindF U | A (where U ⊏ A)
Γ ∈ tcxt ≜ var ⇀ t•ype
(Γ1 ⊔ Γ2)(x) ≜ Γ1(x) ⊔ Γ2(x)
K ∈ type→ kind
K(bitρ
ℓ
) ≜ K(τ1 → τ2) ≜ K(ref(τ )) ≜ U K(flipρ ) ≜ A K(τ1 × τ2) ≜ K(τ1) ⊔ K(τ2)
Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ
VarU
K(Γ(x)) = U
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ
VarA
K(Γ(x)) = A
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ[x 7→•]
Bit
Γ ⊢ bℓ : bitℓ ; Γ
Flip
ρ , ⊥
Γ ⊢ flipρ () : flipρ ; Γ
Cast-S
Γ ⊢ x : flipρ ;
Γ ⊢ castS(x) : bitρS ; Γ
Cast-P
Γ ⊢ x : flipρ ; Γ′
Γ ⊢ castP(x) : bitP ; Γ′
If
Γ′ ⊢ e1 : τ ; Γ′′1
Γ ⊢ e : bitP ; Γ′ Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′2
Γ ⊢ if(e){e1}{e2} : τ ; Γ′′1 ⊔ Γ′′2
Mux-Bit
Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : bitρ2ℓ2 ; Γ
′′ ℓ = ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 ⊔ ℓ3
Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : bitρ3ℓ3 ; Γ
′′′ ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3
Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : bitρℓ × bit
ρ
ℓ
; Γ′′′
Mux-Flip
Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ3
Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : flipρ3 ; Γ′′′ ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3
Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : flipρ × flipρ ; Γ′′′
Xor-Flip
Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Γ ⊢ xor(e1, e2) : flipρ2 ; Γ′′
Ref
Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′
Γ ⊢ ref(e) : ref(τ ) ; Γ′
Read
K(τ ) = U
Γ ⊢ e : ref(τ ) ; Γ′
Γ ⊢ read(e) : τ ; Γ′
Write
Γ ⊢ e1 : ref(τ ) ; Γ′ Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′
Γ ⊢ write(e1, e2) : τ ; Γ′′
Tup
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′ Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′
Γ ⊢ ⟨e1, e2⟩ : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′′
Fun
Γ+ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→τ1,y 7→(τ1→τ2)]
Γ+ ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ+′ Γ+′ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→ ,y 7→ ]
Γ ⊢ funy (x : τ1). e : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ
App
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ′
Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ1 ; Γ′′
Γ ⊢ e1(e2) : τ2 ; Γ′′
Let
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′ Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→τ1]
Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′+ Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ ]
Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′
Let-Tup
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′ Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x1 7→τ1,x2 7→τ2]
Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′+ Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x1 7→ ,x2 7→ ]
Γ ⊢ let x1,x2 = e1 in e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′
Fig. 17. Source Typing
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stepM ∈ N × config ⇀M(config)
stepM (N ,σ ,bℓ) ≜ return(σ , bitvℓ(b))
stepM (N ,σ , flipρ ()) ≜ do b ← bit(N + 1) ; return(σ , flipv(b))
stepM (N ,σ , castℓ(flipv(b))) ≜ return(σ , bitvℓ(b))
stepM (N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ1 (b1), bitvℓ2 (b2), bitvℓ3 (b3))) ≜ return(σ , ⟨bitvℓ(cond(b1,b2,b3)), bitvℓ(cond(b1,b3,b2))⟩)
ℓ ≜ ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 ⊔ ℓ3
stepM (N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ(b1), flipv(b2), flipv(b3))) ≜ return(σ , ⟨flipv(cond(b1,b2,b3)), flipv(cond(b1,b3,b2))⟩)
stepM (N ,σ , xor(bitvℓ(b1), flipv(b2))) ≜ return(σ , flipv(b1 ⊕ b2))
stepM (N ,σ , if(bitvℓ(b)){e1}{e2}) ≜ return(σ , cond(b, e1, e2))
stepM (N ,σ , ref(v)) ≜ return(σ [ι 7→ v], refv(ι)) where ι < dom(σ )
stepM (N ,σ , read(refv(ι))) ≜ return(σ ,σ (ι))
stepM (N ,σ , write(refv(ι),v)) ≜ return(σ [ι 7→ v],σ (ι))
stepM (N ,σ , let x = v in e) ≜ return(σ , [v/x]e)
stepM (N ,σ , let x1,x2 = ⟨v1,v2⟩ in e) ≜ return(σ , [v1/x1][v2/x2]e)
stepM (N ,σ , (funy (x : τ ). e
v1
)(v2)) ≜ return(σ , [v1/y][v2/x]e)
stepM (N ,σ ,E[e]) ≜ do σ ′, e ′ ← stepM (N ,σ , e) ; return(σ ′,E[e ′])
stepM (N ,σ ,v) ≜ return(σ ,v)
nstepM ∈ N × config ⇀M(trace)nstepM (0, ς) ≜ return(ϵ ·ς)
nstepM (N + 1, ς) ≜ do t ·ς ′ ← nstepM (N , ς) ; ς ′′ ← stepM (N + 1, ς ′) ; return(t ·ς ′·ς ′′)
ŝtepM (N , ςˆ) ≜ do ς ← ςˆ ; stepM (N , ς)nstepM (N , ςˆ) ≜ do ς ← ςˆ ; nstepM (N , ς) ŝtepM ∈ N ×M(config)⇀M(config)nstepM ∈ N ×M(config)⇀M(trace)
step ∈ N × config ⇀ I(config)
step(N ,σ ,bℓ) ≜ return(σ , bitvℓ(return(b)))
step(N ,σ , flipρ ()) ≜ return(σ , flipv(bit(N + 1)))
step(N ,σ , castS (flipv(bˆ))) ≜ return(σ , bitvS (bˆ))
step(N ,σ , castP (flipv(bˆ))) ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(σ , bitvP (return(b)))
step(N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ1 (bˆ1), bitvℓ2 (bˆ2), bitvℓ3 (bˆ3))) ≜ return(σ , ⟨bitvℓ(cond(bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), bitvℓ(cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩)
where ℓ ≜ ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 ⊔ ℓ3
step(N ,σ , mux(bitvℓ(bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2), flipv(bˆ3))) ≜ return(σ , ⟨flipv(cond(b̂1, bˆ2, bˆ3)), flipv(cond(bˆ1, bˆ3, bˆ2))⟩)
step(N ,σ , xor(bitvℓ1 (bˆ1), flipv(bˆ2))) ≜ return(σ , flipv(bˆ1 ⊕ˆ bˆ2))
step(N ,σ , if(bitvℓ(bˆ)){e1}{e2}) ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(σ , cond(b, e1, e2))
step(N ,σ , ref(v)) ≜ return(σ [ι 7→ v], refv(ι)) where ι < dom(σ )
step(N ,σ , read(refv(ι))) ≜ return(σ ,σ (ι))
step(N ,σ , write(refv(ι),v)) ≜ return(σ [ι 7→ v],σ (ι))
step(N ,σ , let x = v in e) ≜ return(σ , e[v/x])
step(N ,σ , let x1,x2 = ⟨v1,v2⟩ in e) ≜ return(σ , e[v1/x1][v2/x2])
step(N ,σ , (funy (x : τ ). e
v1
)(v2)) ≜ return(σ , e[v1/y][v2/x])
step(N ,σ ,E[e]) ≜ do σ ′, e ′ ← step(N ,σ , e) ; return(σ ′,E[e ′])
step(N ,σ ,v) ≜ return(σ ,v)
nstep ∈ N × config ⇀ I(trace)
nstep(0, ς) ≜ return(ϵ ·ς)
nstep(N + 1, ς) ≜ do t ·ς ′ ← nstep(N , ς) ; ς ′′ ← step(N + 1, ς ′) ; return(t ·ς ′·ς ′′)
Fig. 18. λobliv Semantics Standard and Mixed
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obs ∈ (exp→ e•xp) ⊎ (store→ st•ore) ⊎ (config→ co•nfig) ⊎ (trace→ tr•ace)
obs(x) ≜ x
obs(funy (x : τ ). e) ≜ funy (x : τ ). obs(e)
obs(bitvP (b)) ≜ bitvP (b)
obs(bitvS (b)) ≜ •
obs(flipv(b)) ≜ •
obs(locv(ι)) ≜ locv(ι)
obs(bP ) ≜ bP
obs(bS ) ≜ •
obs(flipρ ()) ≜ flipρ ()
obs(castℓ(v)) ≜ castℓ(obs(v))
obs(mux(e1, e2, e3)) ≜ mux(obs(e1), obs(e2), obs(e3))
obs(xor(e1, e2)) ≜ xor(obs(e1), obs(e2))
obs(if(e1){e2}{e3}) ≜ if(obs(e1)){obs(e2)}{obs(e3)}
obs(ref(e)) ≜ ref(obs(e))
obs(read(e)) ≜ read(obs(e))
obs(write(e1, e2)) ≜ write(obs(e1), obs(e2))
obs(⟨e1, e2⟩) ≜ ⟨obs(e1), obs(e2)⟩
obs(let x = e1 in e2) ≜ let x = obs(e1) in obs(e2)
obs(let x ,y = e1 in e2) ≜ let x ,y = obs(e1) in obs(e2)
obs(e1(e2)) ≜ obs(e1)(obs(e2))
obs(σ ) ≜ {ι 7→ obs(v) | ι 7→ v ∈ σ } obs(σ , e) ≜ obs(σ ), obs(e) obs(ϵ) ≜ ϵ obs(t ·ς) ≜ obs(t)·obs(ς)
o˜bs ∈ D(trace) → D(tr•ace)
ôbs ∈ I(trace) → I(tr•ace)
o˜bs(t˜) ≜ do t ← t˜ ; return(obs(t)) ôbs(tˆ) ≜ do t ← tˆ ; return(obs(t))
Fig. 19. Adversary Observation
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⌈ ⌉ ∈ exp→ I(exp)
⌈x⌉ ≜ return(x)
⌈funy (x : τ ). e⌉ ≜ do e ← ⌈e⌉ ; return(funy (x : τ ). e)
⌈bitvℓ(bˆ)⌉ ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(bitvℓ(b))
⌈flipv(bˆ)⌉ ≜ do b ← bˆ ; return(flipv(b))
⌈locv(ι)⌉ ≜ return(locv(ι))
⌈bℓ⌉ ≜ return(bℓ)
⌈flipρ ()⌉ ≜ return(flipρ ())
⌈castℓ(v)⌉ ≜ do v ← ⌈v⌉ ; return(castℓ(v))
⌈mux(e1, e2, e3)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; e3 ← ⌈e3⌉ ; return(mux(e1, e2, e3))⌈xor(e1, e2)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(xor(e1, e2))⌈if(e1){e2}{e3}⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; e3 ← ⌈e3⌉ ; return(if(e1){e2}{e3})⌈ref(e1)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; return(ref(e1))⌈read(e1)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; return(read(e1))⌈write(e1, e2)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(write(e1, e2))⌈⟨e1, e2⟩⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(⟨e1, e2⟩)⌈let x = e1 in e2⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(let x = e1 in e2)⌈let x ,y = e1 in e2⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(let x ,y = e1 in e2)⌈e1(e2)⌉ ≜ do e1 ← ⌈e1⌉ ; e2 ← ⌈e2⌉ ; return(e1(e2))
⌈ ⌉ ∈ store→ I(store)
⌈⌉ ≜ return()
⌈{ι 7→ v} ⊎ σ ⌉ ≜ do v ← ⌈v⌉ ; σ ← ⌈σ ⌉ ; return({ι 7→ v} ⊎ σ )
config→ I(config)
⌈σ , e⌉ ≜ do σ ← σ ; e ← e ; return(σ , e)
trace→ I(trace)
⌈ϵ⌉ ≜ return(ϵ)
⌈t ·ς⌉ ≜ do t ← t ; ς ← ς ; return(t ·ς)
⌈ˆeˆ ⌉ˆ ≜ do e ← eˆ ; ⌈e⌉
⌈ˆσˆ ⌉ˆ ≜ do σ ← σˆ ; ⌈σ ⌉
⌈ˆςˆ ⌉ˆ ≜ do ς ← ςˆ ; ⌈ς⌉
⌈ˆtˆ ⌉ˆ ≜ do t ← tˆ ; ⌈t⌉
⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ ∈ I(exp) → I(exp)
⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ ∈ I(store) → I(store)
⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ ∈ I(config) → I(config)
⌈ˆ ⌉ˆ ∈ I(trace) → I(trace)
Fig. 20. Projection
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Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ
VarU
K(Γ(x)) = U Γ(x) = τ
Σ, Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ
VarA
K(Γ(x)) = A Γ(x) = τ
Σ, Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ[x 7→ •]
Bit
Σ, Γ ⊢ bℓ : bit⊥ℓ ; Γ
Flip
ρ , ⊥
Σ, Γ ⊢ flipρ () : flipρ ; Γ
Cast-S
Σ, Γ ⊢ v : flipρ ;
Σ, Γ ⊢ castS(v) : bitρS ; Γ
Cast-P
Σ, Γ ⊢ v : flipρ ; Γ′
Σ, Γ ⊢ castP(v) : bit⊥P ; Γ′
If
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bit⊥P ; Γ′
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′1
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e3 : τ ; Γ′′2
Σ, Γ ⊢ if(e1){e2}{e3} : τ ; Γ′′1 ⊔ Γ′′2
Mux-Bit
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : bitρ2ℓ2 ; Γ
′′ ℓ = ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 ⊔ ℓ3
Σ, Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : bitρ3ℓ3 ; Γ
′′′ ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3
Σ, Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : bitρℓ × bit
ρ
ℓ
; Γ′′′
Mux-Flip
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ3
Σ, Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : flipρ3 ; Γ′′′ ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3
Σ, Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : flipρ × flipρ ; Γ′′′
Xor-Flip
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′ ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′ ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2
Σ, Γ ⊢ xor(e1, e2) : flipρ ; Γ′′
Ref
Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′
Σ, Γ ⊢ ref(e) : ref(τ ) ; Γ′
Read
K(τ ) = U
Σ, Γ ⊢ e : ref(τ ) ; Γ′
Σ, Γ ⊢ read(e) : τ ; Γ′
Write
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : ref(τ ) ; Γ′
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′
Σ, Γ ⊢ write(e1, e2) : τ ; Γ′′
Tup
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′
Σ, Γ ⊢ ⟨e1, e2⟩ : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′′
Fun
Γ+ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1,y 7→ (τ1 → τ2)]
Σ, Γ+ ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ+′ Γ+′ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→ ,y 7→ ]
Σ, Γ ⊢ funy (x : τ1). e : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ
App
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ′
Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ1 ; Γ′′
Γ ⊢ e1(e2) : τ2 ; Γ′′
Let
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′ Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1]
Σ, Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′+ Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ ]
Σ, Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′
Let-Tup
Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′ Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x1 7→ τ1,x2 7→ τ2]
Σ, Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′+ Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x1 7→ ,x2 7→ ]
Σ, Γ ⊢ let x1,x2 = e1 in e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′
BitV
Σ, Γ ⊢ bitvℓ(b) : bitρℓ ; Γ
FlipV
Σ, Γ ⊢ flipv(b) : flipρ ; Γ
LocV
Σ(ι) = τ
Σ, Γ ⊢ locv(ι) : τ ; Γ
Σ ⊢ σ
Store-Empty
Σ ⊢ 
Store-Cons
Σ, ⊢ v : Σ(ι) ; 
Σ, ⊢ σ
Σ ⊢ {ι 7→ v} ⊎ σ
Σ ⊢ ς : τ
Config
Σ ⊢ σ Σ, ⊢ e : τ ; 
Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ
Fig. 21. λobliv Type System Evaluation Standard Expressions
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ΨF ∈flipset ≜ ℘(I(B)) ΨB∈bitset ≜ R→℘(I(B)) Ψ∈fbsetF ΨF ,ΨB Φ∈historyF ςˆ Û= ς
(ΨF1 ,ΨB1 ) ⊎ (ΨF2 ,ΨB2 ) ≜ (ΨF1 ⊎ ΨF2 ), (ΨB1 ∪ ΨB2 ) Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ,Ψ
VarU
K(Γ(x)) = U Γ(x) = τ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ,,
VarA
K(Γ(x)) = A Γ(x) = τ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ x : τ ; Γ[x 7→ •],,
Bit
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ bℓ : bit⊥ℓ ; Γ,,
Flip
ρ , ⊥
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ flipρ () : flipρ ; Γ,,
Cast-S
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ v : flipρ ; , {bˆ},
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ castS(v) : bitρS ; Γ,, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}
Cast-P
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ v : flipρ ; Γ′,Ψ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ castP(v) : bit⊥P ; Γ′,Ψ
If
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2 ⊎ Ψ3,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bit⊥P ; Γ′,Ψ1
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ3,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′1 ,Ψ2
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e3 : τ ; Γ′′2 ,Ψ3
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ if(e1){e2}{e3} : τ ; Γ′′1 ⊔ Γ′′2 ,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2 ⊎ Ψ3
Mux-Bit
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2 ⊎ Ψ3,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′,Ψ1
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ3,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : bitρ2ℓ2 ; Γ
′′,Ψ2 ℓ = ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2 ⊔ ℓ3
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : bitρ3ℓ3 ; Γ
′′′,Ψ3 ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : bitρℓ × bit
ρ
ℓ
; Γ′′′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2 ⊎ Ψ3
Mux-Flip
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2 ⊎ Ψ3,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′,Ψ1 ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ3,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′,Ψ2 ρ1 ⊏ ρ3
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ′′ ⊢ e3 : flipρ3 ; Γ′′′,Ψ3 ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2 ⊔ ρ3
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ mux(e1, e2, e3) : flipρ × flipρ ; Γ′′′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2 ⊎ Ψ3
Xor-Flip
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : bitρ1ℓ1 ; Γ
′,Ψ1 ρ1 ⊏ ρ2
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : flipρ2 ; Γ′′,Ψ2 ρ = ρ1 ⊔ ρ2
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ xor(e1, e2) : flipρ ; Γ′′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2
Ref
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e : τ ; Γ′,Ψ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ ref(e) : ref(τ ) ; Γ′,Ψ
Read
K(τ ) = U
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e : ref(τ ) ; Γ′,Ψ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ read(e) : τ ; Γ′,Ψ
Write
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : ref(τ ) ; Γ′,Ψ1
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ ; Γ′′,Ψ2
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ write(e1, e2) : τ ; Γ′′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2
Tup
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′,Ψ1
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′,Ψ2
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ ⟨e1, e2⟩ : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2
Fun
Γ+ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1,y 7→ (τ1 → τ2)]
Γ+′ = Γ ⊎ [x 7→ ,y 7→ ]
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ
+ ⊢ e : τ2 ; Γ+′,Ψ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ funy (x : τ1). e : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ,Ψ
App
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 ; Γ′,Ψ1
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ′ ⊢ e2 : τ1 ; Γ′′,Ψ2
Γ ⊢ e1(e2) : τ2 ; Γ′′
Let
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ; Γ′,Ψ1 Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x 7→ τ1]
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′+,Ψ2 Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x 7→ ]
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 : τ2 ; Γ′′,Ψ1 ⊎ Ψ2
Let-Tup
Ψc ⊎ Ψ2,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 × τ2 ; Γ′,Ψ1 Γ′+ = Γ′ ⊎ [x1 7→ τ1,x2 7→ τ2]
Ψc ⊎ Ψ1,Φ, Σ, Γ′+ ⊢ e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′+,Ψ2 Γ′′+ = Γ′′ ⊎ [x1 7→ ,x2 7→ ]
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ let x1,x2 = e1 in e2 : τ3 ; Γ′′,Ψ
Fig. 22. λobliv Type System Evaluation Mixed Expressions
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Ψ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Flip-Value
Pr
[
bˆ Û= I
 Φ] = 1/2 [bˆ ⊥ ΨF ,ΨB ({ρ ′ | ρ ′ ⊏ ρ})  Φ]
ΨF ,ΨB ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Ψ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ v : τ ; Γ,Ψ
BitV-P
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ bitvP (return(b)) : bit⊥P ; Γ,,
BitV-S
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ bitvS (bˆ) : bitρℓ ; Γ,, {ρ 7→ {bˆ}}
FlipV
Ψc ,Φ ⊢ bˆ : flipρ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ flipv(bˆ) : flipρ ; Γ, {bˆ},
LocV
Σ(ι) = τ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ, Γ ⊢ locv(ι) : τ ; Γ,,
Ψ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψ
Store-Empty
Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢  ; ,
Store-Cons
Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ v : Σ(ι) ; ,Ψv
Ψc ⊎ Ψv ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ σ ; Ψσ
Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ {ι 7→ v} ⊎ σ ; Ψv ⊎ Ψσ
Ψ,Φ, Σ ⊢ ς : τ ,Ψ
Config
Ψc ⊎ Ψe ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ ; Ψσ Ψc ⊎ Ψσ ,Φ, Σ, ⊢ e : τ ; ,Ψe
Ψc ,Φ, Σ ⊢ σ , e : τ ; Ψσ ⊎ Ψe
Fig. 23. λobliv Type System Evaluation Mixed Values, Store and Configurations
e1 ∼ e2
BitV-P
bitvP (bˆ) ∼ bitvP (bˆ)
BitV-S
bitvS (bˆ) ∼ bitvS (bˆ ′)
FlipV
flipv(bˆ) ∼ flipv(bˆ ′)
LocV
locv(ι) ∼ locv(ι)
Var
x ∼ x
BitP
bP ∼ bP
BitS
bS ∼ b ′S
Flip
flip
ρ () ∼ flipρ ()
Cast
v ∼ v ′
castℓ(v) ∼ castℓ(v ′)
If
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2 e3 ∼ e ′3
if(e1){e2}{e3} ∼ if(e ′1){e ′2}{e ′3}
Mux
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2 e3 ∼ e ′3
mux(e1, e2, e3) ∼ mux(e ′1, e ′2, e ′3)
Xor
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2
xor(e1, e2) ∼ xor(e ′1, e ′2)
Ref
e1 ∼ e ′1
ref(e1) ∼ ref(e ′1)
Read
e ∼ e ′
read(e) ∼ read(e ′)
Write
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2
write(e1, e2) ∼ write(e ′1, e ′2)
Tup
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2
⟨e1, e2⟩ ∼ ⟨e ′1, e ′2⟩
Fun
e ∼ e ′
funy (x : τ ). e ∼ funy (x : τ ). e ′
App
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2
e1(e2) ∼ e ′1(e ′2)
Let
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2
let x = e1 in e2 ∼ let x = e ′1 in e ′2
Let-Tup
e1 ∼ e ′1 e2 ∼ e ′2
let x ,y = e1 in e2 ∼ let x ,y = e ′1 in e ′2
Fig. 24. Low Equivalence Relation
